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ABSTRACT 
DETECTING ABNORMAL SOCIAL ROBOT BEHAVIOR THROUGH  
EMOTION RECOGNITION 
 
 
Rajapaksha Pathiranage, Subhash 
 
Marquette University, 2019 
 
 
Sharing characteristics with both the Internet of Things and the Cyber Physical Systems 
categories, a new type of device has arrived to claim a third category and raise its very own privacy 
concerns. Social robots are in the market asking consumers to become part of their daily routine and 
interactions. Ranging in the level and method of communication with the users, all social robots are 
able to collect, share and analyze a great variety and large volume of personal data. 
 
In this thesis, we focus the community’s attention to this emerging area of interest for privacy 
and security research. We discuss the likely privacy issues, comment on current defense mechanisms 
that are applicable to this new category of devices, outline new forms of attack that are made possible 
through social robots, highlight paths that research on consumer perceptions could follow, and propose 
a system for detecting abnormal social robot behavior based on emotion detection. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The science fiction universe in which humanoids can outperform humans in mostly every 
important aspect of life is still far from reality. However, our privacy is challenged in the present time 
by robots offering to socially engage with us. Unlike a personal digital assistant (e.g. Amazon Alexa, 
Google Home, Apple Siri, and Microsoft Cortana) whose main task is to correctly answer questions 
leveraging a wealth of publicly available data and private information accumulated per user over a 
period of time, a social robot’s goal is to provide meaningful social interactions. Depending on the 
robot’s design, these interactions may be facilitated through verbal cues. 
 Jibo does not have to wait for a user prompt, but it can initiate a discussion. Jibo also shows its 
interest in the human in the room by turning its “face” towards the origin of major sounds that could 
signify voice or movement. More advanced in its features and approximately twenty times more 
expensive, Softbank Pepper’s top priority is to “perceive emotions”. While these are some examples of 
robots currently in the market or soon to be released, a significant number of startups and major 
companies are investing their resources in their own versions of a social robot (SR). 
Evolution of technologies such as artificial intelligence and data sciences are playing a 
significant role in every industry today. Various systems are established in collecting data, processing 
and functioning based on these emerging technologies. Cyber Physical Systems (SPC) and millions of 
Internet of Things (IoT) devices provide various services worldwide. Concepts such as smart homes 
have opened doors to bring more devices to the house that are connected to the network. Therefore, 
within the computer science community, the rise of the SR as a product does not come as a radical 
surprise. Leveraging advancements in the smart phone technology, a SR draws characteristics from the 
Internet of Things (IoT) category. On one hand, it shares limitations on resources such as computing 
power; on the other hand, the SR’s complete functionality often relies on a connection to the 
manufacturer’s cloud for services like face recognition. At the same time, due to its actions on the 
physical domain, a SR can also be categorized as a Cyber Physical System (CPS). Therefore, research 
from both IoT and CPS areas together with research on privacy and security related to traditional 
computing devices needs to be examined in order to identify both existing privacy preserving 
mechanisms and research areas where growth is necessary. 
Our goal is to bring to the spotlight this emerging area of concern for personal privacy as SRs 
have started entering households and facilities that provide care to patients or older adults. In this 
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paper, a) we describe the risks associated with the vast availability, in both quality and quantity, of 
personal data to a SR that is collecting and inferring information about people within its proximity; b) 
we briefly survey current solutions that stem from research in authentication, encryption, CPS and 
intrusion detection, in particular with relation to rootkits and IoT botnets; c) we outline new forms of 
attacks that could materialize through a SR; d) we highlight research directions for exploration in the 
context of consumer perceptions in this new environment; and e) we propose a system for detecting SR 
misbehavior based on emotion detection.  
1.1 Personal Data at Stake 
The hardware components that are present in many SRs include one or more cameras, 
microphones, temperature and motion sensors. In addition, almost all robots have some degree of 
movement available, which ranges from being stationary, but able to face different directions, to 
complete mobility. The freedom of movement and the means through which everyday life events can 
be recorded in a household by a computing device is unprecedented. 
The advent of the IoT and smart home devices that collect data across the house about a 
variety of use patterns (e.g. efficient light usage or temperature control) has already brought the issue 
of privacy to the forefront. If a SR is present in a house that has IoT devices, it is likely that the robot 
will act as the central controller of the IoT devices: the IoT microcontrollers could be sending updates 
to the robot on actions that the homeowner is advised to take or just notifications on the IoT device’s 
operation. The robot will be able to communicate the messages from the IoT device in a more social or 
effective way than the IoT device. For instance, in the event that a water sensor detects flooding in a 
basement, the IoT microcontroller could notify both the owner’s cellphone through a text message and 
the SR. At night, the owner may ignore the text message, but the robot could look for the owner in the 
house and make sure to communicate the event, e.g. by waking him/her up. 
Since more and more in-home medical devices become available, a medical IoT hub needs to 
collect and combine the information from all of them. If the robot acts as the hub, then it could also be 
in possession of sensitive medical records.  
Apart from the data that the robot collects through its own sensors and the data that IoT 
devices may be sharing, the SR is very likely to learn even more, including: questions that the user 
cares about, such as web queries, the user’s food, music and fashion tastes, routine patterns like the 
times the user is away from home, the number of people living in the same household and who they 
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are, how the children of the house look like and how their voices sound, the extent to which the tastes 
of the various household members match. What is more, most SRs run machine-learning algorithms 
that will allow them to infer even information about their users. As a result, the wealth of data that the 
SRs are expected to access, in both quantity and quality, is almost unlimited. 
Concerning is not only the profound data access that a SR will have, but also the inherent 
limitations the users of the robot may have in realizing or effectively preventing privacy breaches. The 
ease of use promise and the social interaction features make the robot a strong candidate as a child’s 
playmate, a recuperating individual’s assistant or an older adult’s companion. Reading bedtime stories 
and reminding someone to take medical pills at the prescribed times are among the use cases that have 
been advertised. If sections of the population that are by default more vulnerable to privacy attacks, e.g. 
due to limited exposure to technology, are going to be the main users of SRs, then the level of concern 
about protecting the privacy of those people should be even higher. 
1.2 Consumer Perception 
The number of SRs already available for sale or advertised to reach the public within months 
has steadily increased in the United States during the last couple of years. At present, there are about 
twenty such robots, while the number is likely to be higher in other countries, such as Japan. The 
market research seems to imply that consumers are likely to adopt this new type of computing device in 
their homes or workplaces. In this set of new products, one can also add the personal, voice-activated 
assistants that are already successful but currently lack mobility and some of the more advanced social 
skills. The welcoming of personal assistants is accredited to a large extent to the perception of the 
consumers, if not reality, that these devices are easier to use than a smartphone or a tablet for certain 
tasks. The promise of home robots is that they will increase not only usability, but also the satisfaction 
one gets from interacting socially with artificial intelligence. 
We believe that it is valuable to explore three research directions that relate to consumer 
attitudes and security in this new environment. One potential danger for consumers is to perceive SRs 
as more secure than other computing devices, if the robots succeed in presenting themselves as likable 
and trustworthy. Science fiction and the media have been presenting for decades ideas to the public 
about the dangers of artificial intelligence. However, the notion that a robot may sound more intelligent 
than a laptop, but could be more vulnerable to specific security attacks (e.g. due to less frequent 
patching) has not enjoyed similar attention. Second, we should investigate whether the SR 
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manufacturers take steps to make the robots not only easier to use, but also easier to secure. A device 
that is capable of satisfying user needs with minimal human intervention can create the false 
impression of being able to maintain its security protections without significant user participation. If a 
SR’s security depends on user action as much as securing a desktop, it is reasonable to expect that 
consumers will be deceived, even unintentionally, regarding the robot’s security. 
Finally, it is worth noting that for a portion of the market of SRs, the individual making the 
financial investment to buy it and the individual using the robot could be different. The SRs are 
advertised to appeal among others to parents, so that they purchase the robot to entertain their children, 
and to adult children who wish to aid their own parents with common older age problems, such as weak 
memory and loneliness. As it has happened with personal assistants, these SRs could also be presented 
as a gift to someone else. If there is a significant percentage of purchases where the person deciding to 
buy the robot is different from the person using the robot, then it is worth asking whether the attitude of 
the user regarding the privacy guarantees of the product depends on who made the financial 
investment. 
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2 SURVEY OF CYBER-ATTACKS ON SOCIAL ROBOTS 
The computing capabilities of a SR tend to lie somewhere between those of an IoT device and 
a personal computer. Several SRs have operating systems, such as the Robot Operating System (ROS) 
or proprietary, that are often more lightweight than a typical Linux distribution. The memory capacity 
is limited, but the user can usually access cloud storage, since the robot often allows Bluetooth or WiFi 
connections. Battery life could be a concern and applications that require extensive computing 
resources are designed to run on the cloud or on a different personal device of the user.  
An important question is whether current security mechanisms can be applied to the SR. The 
question is not merely answered by looking at the technical requirements of existing security solutions, 
due to the SR’s central promise: it has to be easy and pleasant to use. Even transferring the standard use 
of passwords for authentication in the SR environment is not trivial, since many of these devices are 
supposed to be voice or motion triggered, work with several users, and may even lack a touch screen to 
receive user input. It remains to be studied how effective are the authentication mechanisms that 
different manufacturers have opted for, and if they have included them in the robot design in the first 
place. 
In the following, we provide examples of defense approaches that are applicable in the SR 
setting against specific security attacks. We also highlight limitations of these solutions due to the 
inherent characteristics of a SR. We have included research studies that target vulnerabilities in SRs, 
articles that come from the area of cyber physical systems, approaches against botnets, and rootkit 
prevention and detection methods. The reason we focused on the last two types of attacks is that 
botnets have recently caused major concern among the IoT world (e.g. Mirai malware), while rootkits 
are one of the most persistent types of malware.  
2.1 Survey 1: Attack Methods and Social Robot 
We surveyed more than 45 security threats and attacks; those attack surfaces are core network, 
network edge, home network or WIFI, and in side devices. In this survey, we focused on behavior of 
the attack, existing protection mechanisms, and its relativity to social robots. These attacks focus on 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the devices and systems. Denial of Service (Dos) attacks 
has different versions based on its behavior such as Distributed DoS, SYN flood, UDP flood, and 
overwhelming memory. This attack comes under availability, because main purpose of it is to shut 
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down the system. Eavesdropping, scanning and probing, packet sniffing tries to access to data such as 
passwords, financial data, system information, or used in monitoring system behavior. This affects the 
confidentiality of the system or the device. In addition to that, malware comes in various versions. 
They change system data and functions that affect system integrity.  
There are various tools and techniques to protect systems and devices from attacks. These 
prevention tools act in different locations of the system and in different scales. Firewalls are one 
example that provide detection and protection services for the network. Antivirus applications are 
common prevention tools for personal devices. Anti-phishing toolbars in browsers act in a location 
where device or user interface with the network. In addition to that, researches are being done to invent 
new methods and improve accuracy of existing methods. Rootkit detection and prevention researches 
are a good example. That will be discussed later in this chapter. Even though these attacks commonly 
make impact on many of the devices and systems, the significance of the impact is different from 
device to device. At the same time, applicability of these prevention methods also changes based on the 
device. Therefore, in this survey, we tried to identify most impactful existing attacks that can affect 
social robots. Table 1 has summarized results of the survey that shows the most impactful existing 
attacks for social robots. 
 
 
Table 1: Current Threats and Protections for Social Robots 
Threat Current 
Protection Tools 
and Techniques 
Possible Relations to 
Social Robots (SR) 
Limitations to use in SR 
Social 
Engineering 
Two-factor 
authentication, 
social engineering 
prevention 
methods, 
Anti-Phishing 
toolbars which 
compare visiting 
sites with phishing 
sites, Spam 
filtering 
Most of the phishing attacks 
are based upon social 
engineering. In SR setting, 
some of them are obsolete, 
and some are beyond the 
control of SR. Ex: robots 
can identify visually similar 
but fake URLs while robots 
will not identify fake 
emails. Further, if attacker 
could route SR to a fake 
web page by other mean 
like setting up a temporary 
DNS, SR cannot identify 
fake visuals on that web 
site.  
Incompatibility of 
prevention techniques for 
social engineering like 
making web pages 
personally recognizable, 
user awareness to use 
human instinct. 
Browser based solutions 
are not supporting since SR 
will not have browsers. 
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Denial of  
Service (DoS) 
Traffic 
management, load 
balancing tools, 
Check point 
firewall, Collection 
of reverse proxies, 
Null-Routing by 
ISP, Router 
configs: Shutting 
Broadcast, not 
responding to 
ICMP requests, 
Response Rate 
Limiting(RRL) 
SR may provide set of 
essential services via 
internet or in-house 
network. Ex: Online home 
monitoring, in-house device 
control. However, attack 
can shutdown processes or 
entire device, which provide 
essential services. Or else it 
can isolate the device from 
the network. 
Limited resources in SR 
and personal usages at 
home prevent using bulky 
systems such as, Load 
balancers, firewalls, traffic 
management systems, 
reverse proxies. 
Network device 
configurations like RRL 
cannot be expected from 
users. 
Botnet Anti-social 
Engineering based 
identification and 
prevention methods 
Anti-virus software 
firewalls Malware 
detectors 
Honeypot/ 
Honeynet, IRC 
tracking, DNS 
tracking 
SR can become a zombie 
robot. Its setup support 
botnet activities. There can 
be many idle robots to be 
utilized in the long-run. On 
the other hand, robot 
performance can be 
degraded because of botnet 
activities. These activities 
may focus on external 
targets, ex: Mirai. 
Hard to implement 
prevention tools inside SR 
since they are light 
weighted and mobile. In 
addition, SR are not 
working in heavily secured 
sophisticated networks. 
Therefore, Honeypot kind 
of solutions are also 
helpless. 
 
Rootkit Anti-social 
engineering 
concepts for users 
like not clicking on 
unknown emails, 
attachments, links, 
installing certified 
software, etc. User 
based or Kernel 
based anti-rootkit 
software. 
Different robots have 
different capabilities. 
Therefore, intruders with 
root access may get 
different capabilities. 
Higher capabilities higher 
the risk. 
Ex: A robot who can move 
around the house and pick 
door locks can let the 
intruders physically come 
in. A robot who has 
cameras, microphones may 
let intruders to spy. 
Offline rootkit detector is 
not a proper solution since 
SR need real time 
solutions. 
Limitations in prevention 
methods to social 
engineering attacks. On the 
other hand bringing them in 
to a separate central system 
like a cloud for monitoring 
may create complex 
infrastructure requirements 
with additional heavy 
processes. 
Zero-day  
Attack 
Updating/Patching SR can have this type of 
attacks as other systems. 
Moreover, in the similar 
way, designers have to 
foresee such vulnerabilities 
before attackers, and take 
necessary actions. 
Knowledge of users of SR 
to do updates and patching 
OS  
Vulnerabilities 
Regular software 
patching 
OS vulnerability attacks are 
acting in a similar way for 
SR as well. But since SR of 
should support more 
hardware (Motors, sensors) 
than a computer, it could 
have more vulnerability 
chances than a general 
computer 
Cannot expect user to 
install new patches timely, 
because the intended users 
may range from small 
children to old patients 
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Social robots are vulnerable to attacks such as Spoofing, Probing, Session Hijacking, Brute 
force, or Dictionary. However, prevention techniques existing today for those attacks can moistly 
prevent social robots. Apart from that, we identified Social Engineering, DoS, Rootkits, Botnets, Zero-
day attacks and OS vulnerabilities that are some of the most impactful attacks to social robots. Even 
though, there are security tools and techniques exist for preventing systems and devices from them, in 
the social robot setting, these attacks may sneak through these security tools. 
Social Engineering is a very common way to get into systems or take information out. 
Stealing passwords, financial details (credit card numbers) and other personal information or installing 
malicious programs into systems are some its purposes. Natural human instinct is a key prevention 
method for that. Therefore, user awareness is crucial. Sheng et al[1]  has done a demographic analysis 
of phishing susceptibility and effectiveness of interventions. In their survey, a well-designed and 
effective training sessions with readings, games, cartoons and web based training tools have resulted 
that education materials reduced 40% of tendency getting into phishing scams. In online banking, 
websites uses secondary questions, familiar images, nicknames and many other ways to make the page 
familiar to the user. However, Social robots have extended its capabilities to a level where previously 
users required doing. This adds an intermediate level to the user-machine interface. Hence, the user 
may not need to perform functions like reading emails, filling web forms or clicking URLs anymore, 
when social robots perform such functions instead of a human. For example, a browser-like program in 
the social robot may read the HTML code of web pages or a mailbox that may read emails to the user. 
Therefore existing user oriented prevention mechanisms will not defend social engineering based 
attacks with social robots any more. 
Social robots may be used for security monitoring and access controlling, nursing old people, 
differently abled people or children, first aiding with CPR, etc. Therefore, such robots must provide a 
reliable service. If not, the consequences could be even life threatening. Therefore, targeting such 
devices in executing attacks such as DOS and botnets that stops the device from performing is serious. 
Firewalls, traffic management, load balancing, response rate limiting, Intrusion Prevention System 
(IPS) and Intrusion Detection System (IDS) are some of the protection mechanisms which are heavily 
used in sophisticated systems today. Kim, W. et al [2] and Carrow EL [3] provide two types of 
solutions for botnets. One type is common mitigation procedures such as system patch updates, 
disabling JavaScripts, filtering attack signatures, monitor traffic flow. Usually social robots are 
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lightweight and compacted. Therefore, they may not be able to facilitate for some of those protection 
mechanisms. The second type is enterprise level solutions such as Black Hole networks, Honeypots, 
IRC and DNS tracking. However, enterprise level solutions will not also support the SR with the 
design and setting. 
Rootkit has the capability of hide itself from being detected and being inactive until the 
opportunity comes. Musavi SA. et al [4] says that, the rootkit uses different mechanisms such as file 
masquerading, redirecting execution path by hooking, direct kernel object manipulation, changing boot 
sequence, etc. These techniques vary from rootkit to rootkit, making the attack model more complex. 
Further to the paper, underground market is offering rootkit modules included in Malware-as-a-Service 
infrastructure. Romana S. et al [5] explains Bill Blunden’s classification which classify rootkit’s 
hooking technique based on eleven different code and data structures in user and kernel space. 
Anti-rootkit software is a commonly used solution for existing systems. Among them, 
behavior based approach is a common in the rootkit detection. Signature based detection provides 
quick results. However, its accuracy is low, and it cannot identify new attack. Therefore, rootkits can 
hide themselves from those signatures. Behavior-based detection uses different techniques. For 
example, Cui W. et al [6] and Musavi SA. et al [4] use static and dynamic memory analysis in 
detecting rootkits. Xie X. et al [7] reconstructs the system state at hypervisor level to detect rootkits. 
Yin H. et al [8] uses a taint base memory access and flow monitoring technique to detect rootkits. Yin 
H. et al [9] and Romana S. et al [5] use resource access monitoring technique that detects hooks into 
libraries and OS calls. Any such detection method is good for social robots as they are quick and 
lightweight. 
Literature provides different varieties of rootkit detecting mechanisms as well. Most of them 
are offline-based solutions that reconstruct the memory traces or use system images to analyze and 
detect rootkits. Cui W. et al [6] provides such offline memory analysis system. Nevertheless, the SR is 
dynamic and a real time system, which demands an online detection system. In addition to that, Virtual 
Machine Introspection is the currently available most effective rootkit detection technique. Some 
designs consist of hypervisor-based approaches such as Xie X. et al [7]. In the case of rootkits, it is 
interesting to note that many prevention or detection mechanisms rely on virtual memory introspection 
(VMI) techniques. It is questionable whether such solutions could carry over to the SR domain, since 
there seems to be neither good reason nor resources for supporting virtual machines on such a robot. 
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However, evaluation of anti-rootkit tools of Romana S. et al [5] and static memory analysis of 
Musavi SA. et al [4] extract features and parameters that helps in detecting rootkits. This online and 
lightweight approach can open up a way to the SR security model. 
2.2 Survey 2: System Vulnerabilities and Social Robots 
As well as looking at existing attacks types, we studied about vulnerabilities of existing social 
robots and systems, which are similar to social robots. Table 2 consists of a set of literature, which 
addresses vulnerabilities of different systems with suggested solutions. We identified the possibilities 
of appearing those security problems in the SR setting. For each of the system, we discuss applicability 
of suggested solutions to SRs and limitations for applying them. 
 
 
Table 2: Existing Systems and Vulnerabilities 
System Paper System Vulnerabilities Protecting Techniques 
SR Denning T. et al 
[10],  
Jeong S. et al [11] 
Broken Authentication of ROS, 
Vulnerable to  ROS bag of replay 
attack, 
Vulnerabilities of ROS communication, 
Vulnerable to service hijacking, 
Remote identification & discovery, 
Passive & active eavesdropping, Lack 
of operational notification, 
Lack of network security 
 
Provides a set of design 
questions that expose 
issues of social robots 
security, Suggest 
security protocols like 
limiting access and 
encryption 
CPS Templeton SJ. 
[12],  
Lin H et al [13],  
Junejo KN et al 
[14],  
Mitchell R. & 
Chen I.[15] 
 
Poor access control, 
Poor input validation, 
Lack of robustness, 
Implementation errors, 
Limited interoperability, 
Lack of preventive safety, 
Naïve assumptions about security, 
Proprietary solutions, 
Safety lock outs 
Suggestions such as 
awareness, 
standardization, 
certifications. Security 
models. 
IoT Al-Sarawi S. et al 
[16], 
Mustapha, H & 
Alghamdi A.M. 
[17], 
Bertino, E & 
Islam, N.[18] 
Park, J. et al[19] 
Insufficient 
authentication/authorization, 
Insecure network services, 
Insufficient security configurability, 
Insecure software or firmware 
Security practices such 
as changing default 
password, updating 
security patches, 
disabling Universal 
Plug and Play (UPnP), 
monitoring ports and 
anomalous traffic. 
 
 
The logic behind selecting the Cyber Physical System (CPS) as an SR-related category is 
because it has a similar set of behaviors. According to Junejo KN et al [14], the CPS is defined as an 
overlay of cyber sensing and control over a physical system for various mission-critical tasks. Mitchell 
R. and Chen I. [15] look into large-scale, geographically dispersed life critical systems that comprise 
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sensors, actuators, controls and networking components. In comparison, The SR comprises of sensors, 
actuators, and networked systems operating in both cyber and physical domains, even involved in life 
critical operations. The cyber domain of the SR inherits from computers and the physical domain 
inherits from electrical, mechanical, and electronics units such as sensors, motors, etc. Therefore, the 
SR can also be categorized as a CPS and security related studies of CPSs work closely with SRs as 
well. In the same way, IoT can be considered as a kind of distributed systems of a CPS or SR. We 
analyzed the facts in studied literature under different sections such as vulnerabilities, attack models, 
detection techniques and performance measurement.  
2.2.1 Vulnerabilities 
The cyber domain of social robots inherits from computers. Therefore, most of the computer 
system vulnerabilities exist in the SR setting as well. WIFI connectivity and the internet connection can 
allow attackers to penetrate into the SR, application and operating system level vulnerabilities are used 
in attacks, or the data communication with the outside can be manipulated. In addition to that, physical 
domain of the SR also carries a set of vulnerabilities as well. The SR uses many sensors and actuators 
in the operation. Microcontrollers may not check authentication to send sensor data to the outside or 
they may be not using encryptions.  
Some SRs have already been shown to lack fundamental security mechanisms such as proper 
authentication[20]. Jeong S. et al [11] discusses four vulnerabilities in the Robot Operating System 
(ROS), which is one of the most widely deployed operating systems in robots. The vulnerabilities 
include replay attacks and service hijacking, for which countermeasures are available (e.g. encryption). 
Giaretta et. al. [21] investigates the security levels of Pepper, a popular humanoid, and suggests 
improvements. Denning T. et al [10] analyzes vulnerabilities of three older household robots, Rovio, 
Spykee and RoboSapien, V2, such as Man in the Middle (MITM) attacks, unauthorized access to 
audio-visual streams and login credential leakage. The suggested solutions target the robot design 
phase and are structured around a set of design questions aimed at exposing privacy and security issues. 
According to our study, the second system type, the CPSs include vulnerabilities that possibly 
appear in the SR setting. Lin H et al [13] discusses three general penetration points in the CPS design: 
measurement output from the hardware, measurement input to control algorithm and command input to 
physical process. The SR may probably has these similar penetration points. Malware can change 
command inputs to run a desired malicious action. Similarly, malicious activities can read and change 
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measurements. In addition to that, Templeton SJ. [12] talks about a set of general vulnerabilities that 
CPSs have such as poor access control, poor input validation, lack of robustness, implementation 
errors, limited interoperability, lack of prevention safety, naïve assumptions about security, etc. These 
also directly apply in the designing and operating phases of the SR setting. 
When it comes to IoT, there are even more basic vulnerabilities exist. Mustapha, H & 
Alghamdi A.M. [17] identifies some of them such as Insufficient authentication and Insecure network 
services, Lack of transport encryption and integrity verification, Insecure software or firmware. 
Bertino, E & Islam, N.[18] discusses about a list of reasons for IoT security risk. Among them, IoT 
design issues such as not having defined perimeters, being heterogeneous with respect to 
communication medium, protocols, platforms and devices, which can directly be a vulnerability in 
social robots because social robots can be made for different purposes and usages by different 
manufactures, with different physical capabilities under different designs. Park, J. et al[19] also talks 
about similar vulnerabilities. Apart from the design, social robot and IoT have similar risky behaviors 
such as not existing of permission requests for installation of software and many user interactions or 
granular permission requests. Another common risky behavior is acting as autonomous entities that 
control other IoT devices.  
2.2.2 Threat Models 
The SR can become the target of various types of attacks. Their targets, mechanism, activating 
time and duration, purpose and outcome will be different from each other. Incorporating these attack 
models in designing prevention mechanisms is an important strategy. Concerning the social robot 
context study, Denning T. et al [10] discusses possible targets such as elders or children who may get 
damaged physically or psychologically, also mechanisms such as robot vandalism, or collective robot 
attacks.  
In CPS study, Mitchell R. and Chen I.’s [15] survey on CPS IDS designs reflects some attack 
characteristics such as different durations, launching time and mechanisms, and host or network 
orientation. Junejo KN et al’s  [14] work shows a behavior of data injection or change in systems. In 
the same way, Lin H et al [13] and Templeton SJ. [12] discuss about targets such as data and control 
command integrity in CPS. Park, J. et al[19] explanations STRIDE model towards IoT that affects 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. The STRIDE is a model to identify security threats, which 
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has six components (Spoofing of user identity, Tampering Repudiation, Information disclosure 
(privacy breach or data leak), Denial of service (DoS), and Elevation of privilege).  
As SR shares similar characteristics with CPS and IoT, it is vulnerable to most of these attack 
models. Their targets, purpose and outcome are different. Therefore, SR protection mechanisms need to 
study all the possible attack models to make it effective. 
2.2.3 Detection Techniques 
Unlike conventional personal computers, the SR has more facts to consider in order to 
securing it because of its additional functionalities and capabilities, excessive time criticality and 
reliability of services, possessing user’s excess information and physical safety. Though the network 
based malicious activities can be mitigated by existing techniques, vulnerabilities inside and interacting 
points of SR with outside need a strong concern due to these facts. Mitchell R. and Chen I. [15] talks 
about four characteristics that a CPS intrusion detection should have such as Physical Process 
Monitoring (PPM), Closed Control Loop (CCL), Attack Sophistication (AS), Legacy Technology (LT). 
PPM and LT are more specific to CPS, which may come common with SRs. CCL and AS are also 
good aspects to be think about when designing a protection mechanism to SR. Therefore, employing 
intrusion detection techniques in the SR is complex than a personal computer. Further, the design of the 
SR is another factor that should be considered. By the design itself, some simple detection mechanisms 
can be originated in detecting and securing. Denning T. et al [10] says not having designed features 
such as generating noises when moving and stationary but active, audible alert when logging in to SRs 
can become a vulnerability.  This is very important in human-SR interaction. Because, user awareness 
in one of the most important topic in the SR security. 
Accuracy is another important fact that the SR detection technique needs. Low accuracy risks 
the safety of the user. This will lead to jeopardizing sensitive information, life critical services and 
physical safety. Junejo KN et al [14] evaluates machine learning (ML) classifiers on a specific CPS 
illustrating how privacy and security mechanisms could be enhanced through ML techniques in a time 
critical environments. This can be considered in developing a security mechanism to SR.  Signature 
based and Behavior based detection approaches are common among researchers. Signature base 
approaches are fast, accurate and light weight but susceptible for new form of attacks while behavior 
based approaches are slow, low in accuracy and may be bulky. Therefore, detection technique with 
high accuracy is needed which has compatible characteristics with the SR setting. 
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Lin H et al [13] says that attacks in CPSs are difficult to detect by monitoring the cyber or 
physical domains separately from each other. For example, lighting intensity control command in a SR 
can be changed maliciously into a different legitimate value in the cyber domain, but the change 
happens in the physical system can harm eyes of an infant in the crib. Therefore, cyber and physical 
interaction and propagation of effects to sub-systems are some important facts to consider in accurate 
detection of malicious activities in the SR. 
As above example shows SR’s involvement with IoT, incorporating IoT based detection 
techniques are also vital. As explained in Bertino, E & Islam, N.[18], users and developers should 
perform known best security practices. However, SR is for different users, such as kids, patients and 
elder people, incorporating these practices in designing and adding additional service units for security 
is important.  
2.2.4 Performance Metrics 
Delayed detections and leaving some attacks undetected by the protection protocols makes the 
SR half-open to threats even when a protection mechanism is included. False alarms interrupt the 
services and use limited resources of SR unnecessarily. Therefore, validating the performance of 
detection system is critical. Mitchell R. and Chen I. [15] says that generally in detection systems false 
positives, false negatives and true positives are common factors to measure detecting performance, but 
detection latency is rarely used. Social robots are very dynamic and time-critical in behavior. A 
malicious change of the motor rotation speed in a control message can damage the child or the patient 
that the SR is serving to if the detection is delayed. Throughout the time, machines took a long time to 
win the trust from people for being precise and accurate due to the latency in detecting, processing and 
reacting. Therefore, while delays in detecting adversaries make the user vulnerable, the trust the users 
having towards social robots will collapse.  
Mitchell R. and Chen I. [15] further says that the resource limitations, power consumption, 
communications overhead and processor load are also important facts in performance measuring. 
Social robot has extended limitations on power, memory, processing or time based on the providing 
service. Therefore, aforementioned factors become main conditions in measuring the performance in 
the SR. Junejo KN et al [14] uses a detection mechanism specific parameter (Time To Build the Model: 
time taken for machine learning training). Such method specific or attack model specific parameters 
may also be used in the performance metrics. 
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Therefore, identifying all the possible vulnerabilities and lining up all possible existing and 
expected attack models would be a good start. Based on that, designing well performing and fully 
compatible detection mechanism would be a vital strategy for the SR security. 
2.2.5 Applicability & Limitations of Existing Solutions 
Incorporating available solutions in each category to the new design of SR detection 
mechanism is important.  As shown in the Table 2, different system types propose number of 
successful solutions to protect users and devices from attacks. However, it is important to discuss the 
applicability of them in the SR setting. Applying them into social robots depends on the technology, 
resources, expected outcome and compatibility of the solution to the SR.  
CPSs based research papers mostly refer to a specific system to provide a solution. Lin H et al 
[13] discusses a behavior based detection model related to a surgical robotic system and a power grid. 
The model uses the incoming command and current physical state of the system to predict the system 
impact ahead. This is a compatible approach to the SR to develop a detection mechanism. However, 
social robots are not only work under commands. It has machine learning algorithms to take own 
decisions in certain scenarios. For example, it can respond to sounds in the environment without user 
involvement.  
Templeton SJ. [12] gives suggestions to improve security and safety on CPSs such as 
education and awareness improvement for developers, standardizing security and reliability, security 
certifications for CPSs, safety engineering to security, product liability reforms. These are valid for 
most of the systems we have today including SRs. Apart from that, these literature provides 
information and knowledge. For example, Mitchell R. and Chen I. [15] provides informative survey 
with number of papers on CPSs that includes detection techniques, attack types, audit features, etc. 
Junejo KN et al [14] provides an evaluation of machine learning classifiers, which makes more insights 
to classifiers when utilizing them. The SR can employ machine learning based model to build a 
security algorithm. As stated in the IoT protection methods, the security practices are more essential for 
manufacturers than users, as they cannot be expected from users.  
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2.3 Unique Security Issues for Social Robots 
Though OS vulnerabilities, Zero-day attacks, phishing attacks, DDoS attacks and rootkits are 
significant threats for social robots, they are common for many other systems. However, the social 
robot environment could allow older type of attacks to mutate and gain new forms.  
Social engineering is a domain that is likely to be transformed. Instead of trying to create 
appealing electronic mail messages that can bypass spam filters, an attacker might focus on creating 
downloadable robot skills (the equivalent of a smart phone app) with aesthetic and socially engaging 
features. It is not only the financial status of a user that could be affected by attacks through social 
robots, but also the physical safety. In cases where the robot communicates to the user medical results 
or reminders, passing misinformation could result in the user suffering from medication overdose or 
other life threatening circumstances. If an intruder was able to access patterns that the robot has 
identified, the intruder would be able to strengthen any kind of attack. For example, the SR could infer 
the times and days that the user tends to be most tired. During these time periods, a social engineering 
attack will have higher probability of success. A maliciously acting robot might also pretend to place 
calls to friends or family members without ever attempting to actually establish the necessary network 
connection. 
Not only mutated version of attacks, social robot setting can develop new forms of attacks as 
well. Since many robots have mobility, a malicious physical move against an individual with 
diminished mobility or low body mass could also cause significant harm. Similarly, attacks targeting a 
person’s state of mind and mood could be developed. We categorize it to two, short-term and long-
term. In short-term basis, if social interactions with an appropriately designed robot can make a person 
feel less isolated, tweaking the robot’s behavior might result into worsening someone’s mental and/or 
psychological status. For instance, a hacked robot might stop initiating a discussion or could suggest 
actions that are known to deteriorate the user’s capabilities (e.g. encourage heavy drinking). In the 
long-term, attacks that can detect user emotion can identify user’s most vulnerable time of the day and 
use them to push users to take attacker favorable decision. A hacked robot, which is designed to use as 
a teaching assistant, may be used to implant opinions on children’s mind such as hate or racism.  
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3 USER-ROBOT INTERACTION EMOTION DETECTION 
In this research, we try to concentrate on the new area, where impact on human emotion by 
misbehaving social robots. While SRs are becoming human-companions that could be the device that 
people are mostly interacting with in their daily life. This is a good opening to outsiders to monitor 
someone's mindset, emotions, sensitivity for things experiencing and many other mind related 
information. SR's also may have access to other information such as medical history, treatments, job 
information, financial details, online accounts, contacts, schedules, etc which may be used combined in 
attacks. That being said, manipulation of human emotions individually or as a group can be expected in 
the future. Not only the attacks, but misconfigurations, erroneous results from machine learning 
algorithm and many other reasons may cause similar security issues in the human robot interaction. 
Therefore, the importance for having solutions for these type of attacks is real as we are moving 
forward with these technologies.  
Emotion recognition analysis is the proposing solution in this research. Therefore, we 
developed a feature filtering method and machine learning models for emotions recognition, which will 
be used in identifying emotions expressed by both the user and robot. Later, results will be analyzed. 
Although our focus is to identify misbehaviors, our feature filtering method is not specific to this 
context and can be used as a general machine learning feature selection process. 
3.1 Literature Review 
Emotion recognition has been researched for decades and has acquired a significant 
improvement collaborating with machine learning, natural language processing, audio and video signal 
processing. Schuller, BJ. [22] gives a good explanation for the emotion recognition road map. 
Researches are trying to improve emotion recognition accuracy using various combinations of features 
and various fusion methods. Selection of emotion states for the classification varies based upon 
research groups. Roh Yw et al [23] provides a list of research groups and the emotion states they used 
for emotion recognition. Further, it states that it is desirable to use fundamental emotions in 
classifications. With a background study, it continues to say that Anger, Happiness, Sadness and 
Neutral are the most fundamental. Categorical emotions such as Sad, Happy, Angry, etc are not the 
only outcome in emotion recognition. Aldeneh Z. and Khorram S. [24] predict Valence from acoustic 
and lexical features under several pooling options. Rong J. et al [25] classifies emotion into two basics, 
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negative and positive due to uncertainties in the definition of emotion states. Researchers use multi 
class classification or binary classification and fusion for combining different emotions obtained from 
different sources. 
 Speech/audio is a well-recognized source for identifying emotions. There are many 
researches, which focus on acoustic features. Savran, A. et al [26] uses video, audio and lexical 
indicators. Not only audio, video and text, Tian L. et al [27] uses dialogue cues to predict emotions. 
Having different sources with different feature sets, classification can be done in two ways; unimodal 
with combining all the features into one set or multimodal with different set of features and fusing 
them. Chuang, Z.J. and Wu, C.H. [28] uses a multi modal approach to classify emotion from speech 
and text. 
Anagnostopoulos and Ilious [29] uses pitch, energy, MFCCs and Formants prosodic features 
and another 133 features calculated based on these four groups. Praat [30] is the tool used in feature 
extraction. Rong J. et al [25] uses Duration and Discrete Fourier Transformations features in addition to 
above four features for emotion recognition. Chen, S. et al [31] uses Continuos, Qualitative and 
Cepstral feature sets and statistical functions of those features for their classification. Rozgic V. et al 
[32] uses derived features from Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC), statistical functionals of 
low-level feature descriptors combining with lexical features to emotion recognition. When it comes to 
text feature extraction, natural language processing is a key component. Porter, M.F. [33] processes 
words to be used in lexical feature extraction. Jin, Q. et al [34] uses Bag of Words features and e-vector 
lexical features. 
Feature selection is an important preprocessing step in machine learning. That helps filter out 
most relevant features for leaning, which increase reliability and accuracy of the modal. Li, J. et al [35] 
provides a detailed survey about feature selection. There are tools available for preprocessing and 
selecting features. Sk-learn toolkit by Pedregosa, F. [36] provides various feature selection methods 
such as removing feature with low variance, Univariate feature selection, Recursive feature 
elimination, etc. Anagnostopoulos and Ilious [29] uses WEKA[37] data mining tool for data selection. 
Chen, S. et al [31] does not filter features, but using all of them for classification. Yu, L. and  Liu, H. 
[38] introduces correlation based novel concept, predominant correlation, and proposes a fast filter 
method which filters features without pairwise correlation analysis. Cheung, Y. and Jia, H. [39] 
Chormunge, S. and Jena, S. [40] discuss about feature selection using clustering.  
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Selection of a dataset for training emotion recognition algorithm vary from research group to 
group. There are available databases for emotion recognition while some groups create and use their 
own databases. Anagnostopoulos and Ilious [29] uses Speaker Independent Recognition in Berlin 
Database. AVEC2012 [41], RADVESS [42] are another popular databases for emotion recognition 
used by researchers. 
In multi-modal classification, fusion is a process which combines the results given by the all 
the models. This is another topic where separate researches are taken place. Mainly there are two type 
of fusions; Decision level fusion which is merging decisions given by classifiers and Feature level 
fusion which is concatenating all the features before classification. Planet, S. and Iriondo, I. [43] is 
doing a comparison among these two fusion methods to identify outperforming fusion. Jin, Q. et al [34] 
uses different sets of classification results from different combinations of acoustic and lexical features, 
and use them to obtain best pair wise fusion options. Finally, fusing those best combinations to get a 
higher accuracy. Tian L. et al [27] introduces a Hierarchical-Level fusion strategy incorporates more 
abstract features.  
This research focuses on predicting conversational emotions of users using utterances with 
emotion recognition work done before. We use multimodal  binary classification, hence, prepare a 
foundation for developing temporal emotion patterns of the user and identifying suspicious behaviors 
of emotion flow in conversations between human and social robot interaction when the measuring 
pattern deviating from expected pattern. 
3.2 Methodology 
We propose a system that detects inappropriate SR behavior by keeping track of the emotions 
demonstrated by both the user and the SR over an interaction time window. This system is expected to 
be in close proximity to the user and the SR, but not part of the SR hardware configuration (e.g. 
separate device in the same room). Making the detection system independent of the SR adds a layer of 
protection in case the SR gets compromised by a malicious entity. The detection device needs to be 
equipped with a sensor that captures audio signals (e.g. microphone) from both the user and the SR. 
Alarming is a case where the system detects that the emotional condition of the user degrades after the 
interaction with the SR, which could be caused by either SR misconfiguration or hacking. Equally 
concerning could be the case where the SR demonstrates emotions that are unsuitable towards a 
specific user, such as anger. 
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Machine learning (ML) is being used in a variety of fields, including network intrusion 
detection, to differentiate between expected and abnormal behavior. In the domain of natural language 
processing (NLP), ML techniques aid in detecting variations of a person’s emotions during a 
conversation. 
We developed a multi-model detection algorithm to detect expressing emotions of both the 
user and the robot when they are interacting with each other. Audio is our main stream of identifying 
the emotion. We used filtered audio features set and trained different binary classifiers separately for 
each emotion. In order to identify most accurate classifier we trained eight machine-learning classifiers 
namely, Logistic Regression (LR), Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), K Neighbors Classifier 
(KNN), Decision Tree Classifier (CART), Gaussian NB (NB), Support Vector Classifier (SVM), Ada 
Boost Classifier (ABC), K Means (KMC). 
We used scikit-learn [36] for training and testing of these classifiers. Scikit-learn known as sk-
learn, is a commercially usable open source machine learning tool set for data mining and data 
analysis. We used Cross-validation in the training process, which avoids overfitting in testing. It splits 
the training data set into k smaller sets. Then it keeps aside one portion of sets and train the algorithm 
from the others. By using remaining small set, it test the trained model. This process is iteratively done 
until all the small sets are used as test sets. Then all results obtained in k rounds are taken into an 
average value, which is the accuracy of the trained model. We did this process to all the machine-
learning classifiers to identify the most accurate classifier.  
First, we extracted features from audio (wave files). Then we used a naval feature filtering 
method to identify most effective feature set for each binary classification. By using the filtered feature 
sets, we did binary classification to identify appearance of each emotions for the utterance. We always 
used the same data set for training, but when classifying one emotion all other emotions were placed in 
the same category. For example, when training algorithms to identify Happiness, all other emotions 
were annotated as Other. Then we analyzed emotion change from utterance to utterance in a dyadic 
conversation. 
3.3 Dataset 
Our experiment used The Interactive Emotional Dyadic Motion Capture database 
(IEMOCAP) [44], which is a multimodal, multi-speaker and acted database. This database includes 
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video, motion capture of face, Head Movement and Head Angle Information, audio, text data of 
approximately 12 hours. Ten actors have performed improvisations and scripts. Each utterance 
consists of categorical annotation labeling into 9 different emotion categories such as Happiness, 
Excitement, Sadness, Anger, Frustration, Fear, Surprise, Neutral and Other, as well as it consists of 
dimensional annotation labeling as Activation, Dominance and Valence. Multiple annotators have 
annotated each utterance and it includes a self-annotation as well. A composite categorical and 
dimensional value for each utterance is also included in the data set.  
Out of these nine categorical emotions, we used four basic emotions namely, Happiness, 
Sadness, Anger, and Neutral. We considered the composite categorical annotation as the emotion 
representation of the utterance, since more than one annotators confirm it. The data set consists of five 
sessions. Each session consists of several improvisations and scripted scenarios performed by two 
actors. We used first three sessions of the data set for training algorithms and four and five for testing. 
Table 3 shows the composition of the data set. 
 
 
Table 3: Dataset Used in Machine Learning 
 
 
3.4 Audio Analysis 
In this study, we use wave files of utterances in IEMOCAP as audio input. OpenSMILE [45] is 
an audio feature-extracting toolkit that we utilized under the configuration according to “The 
INTERSPEECH 2010 Paralinguistic Challenge” [46]. By this configuration, we extracted 1582 
features per each utterance using OpenSMILE.  
According to OpenSMILE user manual document, these 1582 features includes 21 functionals 
(min, stddev, max, mean, etc) extracted from 34 low-level descriptors (LLD) and 34 corresponding 
delta coefficient ((34+34) x 21 = 1428). Then it includes 19 functionals extracted from 4 pitch-based 
LLD and their four delta coefficient contours (19x4x2 = 152). Finally, it includes the number of pitch 
onsets and the total duration of the input (2). 
Further OpenSmile document describes that the 34 LLDs are, 
 pcm loudness - The loudness as the normalized intensity raised to a power of 0.3 
 MFCC - Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients 0-14 
 Happiness Excitement Sadness Anger Neutral Total 
Training 387 504 696 606 1065 3258 
Test 194 496 362 368 595 2015 
22 
 
 
 
 logMelFreqBand - logarithmic power of Mel-frequency bands 0 - 7 (distributed over a range 
from 0 to 8 kHz) 
 lspFreq - The 8 line spectral pair frequencies computed from 8 LPC coefficients 
 F0finEnv - The envelope of the smoothed fundamental frequency contour 
 voicingFinalUnclipped - The voicing probability of the final fundamental frequency 
candidate. Unclipped means that it was not set to zero when is falls below the voicing 
threshold 
In addition, the four pitch related LLDs are, 
 F0final - The smoothed fundamental frequency contour 
 jitterLocal - The local (frame-to-frame) Jitter (pitch period length deviations) 
 jitterDDP - The differential frame-to-frame Jitter (the Jitter of the Jitter) 
 shimmerLocal - The local (frame-to-frame) Shimmer (amplitude deviations between pitch 
periods) 
3.4.1 Binary Classification 
 Binary classification refers to classifying a set into two groups. Under this method, we 
classified each emotion separately. We used same training data set, but when classifying one emotion 
all the other emotions are considered as one category. For example, when training algorithms to 
identify Happiness, all the other emotions annotated as Other. 
Then we used a feature filtering method to identify most effective feature set for binary 
classification. We developed this filtering technique in order to identify most effective features in 
binary classification. By using this, we filtered a new feature sets for each emotion and did the binary 
classification for each emotion category.  
For every binary classification, we trained all the selected classifiers in order to identify best 
performing classifier for further use. At the same time, we used cross validation in every binary 
classification with 10 splits and 20% validation. 
3.4.2 Feature Filtering 
Some features extracted from the audio, has values that can distinguish different emotion 
categories. Emotions such as anger and excitement have high energy than others such as sad and 
neutral. Each audio utterance has 1582 extracted features and some of these features may have unique 
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values for one emotion as opposed to others. Such features are valuable in distinguishing between 
emotions, while features that do not exhibit this behavior could be ignored from the classification 
process. In this Section, we present a new method for feature selection. 
Let fij denote the value of feature i for sample j. Then, we define sets H = {fij: sample has been 
characterized as carrying emotion Happiness} and T = {fij : sample j has been characterized as carrying 
emotion Sadness, Anger or Neutral}. 
For each feature i in the H set we perform unsupervised K-means clustering to find the cluster 
center cHi. If fHimin is the minimum value of feature i in set H and fHimax is the maximum value of feature 
i in set H, then we define the range around the cluster center cHi as, 
 rHi = min{|cHi − fHimin|, |cHi − fHimax|} 
Similarly, for each feature i in the T set we perform unsupervised K-means clustering to find 
all N cluster centers cTni , where 1 ≤ n ≤ N. These cluster centers represent high-density areas of the data 
point distribution of other emotion categories. We can now define the distance DHni = |cHi − cTni |. If 
cTki is the cluster center for an emotion other than Happiness that is closest to the cluster center for 
Happiness cHi, then we define the minimum distance DHi ≡ DHki. Since different features have different 
data ranges, we normalize the fij values into a [0, 100] range, so that we can compare the diversity and 
distances among cluster centers across features.  
Finally, we use the notion of inclusion to represent the percentage of cluster centers of other 
emotion categories that reside within the Happiness cluster range. We define the data sets,  
RHi = {cTni: DHn i < rHi, 1 ≤ n ≤ N} and AHi = {cTni, 1 ≤ n ≤ N}.  
Then, we define inclusion as,  
LHi = #RH / #AHi × 100%.  
It should be noted that we repeat the binary classification and derive the minimum distance 
and inclusion values for every emotion. 
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Figure 1: ‘Happiness’ Cluster Center Among the ‘Other’ Emotion Cluster Centers for the Feature 
pcm_loudness_sma_amean 
 
Figure 1 shows an example for feature pcm_loudness_sma_amean in the binary classification 
for emotion Happiness. The lowest value of this feature (0.085) was exhibited by a sample utterance 
that was annotated under the Other emotion category. The highest value of this feature (1.755328) was 
exhibited by a sample utterance that was annotated as Happiness, so this is also the fHimax value. In the 
normalized scale, these two values correspond to 0 and 100. For this feature, there are eight cluster 
centers for category Other and seven of those fall within the range of the Happiness cluster center. 
Therefore, inclusion is high (87.5%). 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Feature Filtering and Binary Classification 
In order to identify critical features that the classification strongly depends on, we carried out 
the feature filtering process. After calculating Inclusion and Min_Distance for each feature for a 
particular emotion, we analyzed it using a graphical representation. Figure 2 shows a the Inclusion 
against Min_Distance for all the features for Happiness emotion categories. 
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Figure 2: Min_Distance vs. Inclusion of Features with Happiness Characteristics  
 
 
The figure shows that some features do not show distinct characteristics for Happiness than 
Other emotion categories. Especially features that are close to (0,100) point have mixed characteristics 
that cannot be used to distinguish Happiness. Features that have higher Min_Distance and lower 
Inclusion explain the emotion well.  
In order to confirm this, we carried out a series of tests that trains machine-learning algorithms 
using different combinations of these two parameters. Each combination filters outs a set of features 
and then those features are used to train algorithms. Table 4 shows such combinations and their results 
for each emotion classification. The combination notation (40 & 2) denotes Inclusion lower than 40% 
& Min_Distance greater than two. 
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Table 4: Binary Classifier Accuracy for Inclusion and Min_Distance Combinations 
Combination Anger Happiness Neutral Sadness 
15 & all 0.778922(LR) 0.862028(LR) 0.625051(ABC) 0.775755(ABC) 
30 &_all 0.793459(ABC) 0.862028(LR) 0.649095(ABC) 0.803023(ABC) 
40 &_2 0.781647(LR) 0.862028(SVM) 0.636837(ABC) 0.811174(ABC) 
40 &_2.5 0.781645(LR) 0.86021(LR) 0.615045(LDA) 0.820701(SVM) 
40 &_3 0.781647(LR) 0.862028(LR) 0.614591(LR) 0.814364(SVM) 
50 &_2 0.863367(LR) 0.860666(LR) 0.683626(ABC) 0.826619(LR) 
65 &_2 0.876991(LDA) 0.862028(SVM) 0.699556(LR) 0.828885(LR) 
80 &_2 0.876991(LDA) 0.862028(SVM) 0.723137(LR) 0.82977(LR) 
80 &_2.5 0.891514(LR) 0.862026(LR) 0.715411(LR) 0.833416(LDA) 
80 &_3 0.891518(LR) 0.860671(LR) 0.716759(ABC) 0.830247(LR) 
80 &_3.5 0.876524(LR) 0.863387(SVM) 0.699039(LDA) 0.825257(LR) 
80 &_4 0.868809(LR) 0.862028(LR) 0.674101(ABC) 0.80391(LDA) 
90 &_2 0.903772(LDA) 0.862028(SVM) 0.715856(LR) 0.827534(ABC) 
90 &_2.5 0.900586(LDA) 0.862937(LR) 0.719484(LR) 0.838863(LR) 
90 &_3 0.89832(LDA) 0.86703(LR) 0.720852(LR) 0.835699(LR) 
90 &_3.5 0.889706(LR) 0.869751(LDA) 0.714486(ABC) 0.827982(LR) 
100 &_2 0.887884(LDA) 0.862028(SVM) 0.719044(LR) 0.8266(LR) 
all 0.875167(ABC) 0.862028(SVM) 0.705866(LR) 0.830243(ABC) 
 
 
Based on this result, we obtained that the approximate highest accuracy is given at 90 & 2.5 
combination. We started the test with a lower Inclusion value and increased it while keeping 
Min_Distance at a low value. At 90%, the accuracy got maximum and started reducing thereafter. Then 
we increased the Min_Distance. At 2.5, it gave the maximum accuracy and started reducing thereafter. 
Therefore, we can say that, the features that have Inclusion less than 90% and Min_Distance greater 
than 2.5 are most affective features. Features in the red zone in the graph affected the accuracy 
negatively.  
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We used k-means clustering for the clustering process. K-means starts clustering with 
arbitrary points and iteratively adjust it until it get close to center point of the data set. Therefore, for 
the same dataset, k-means clustering will give close but different center values in several clustering 
processes. Therefore, our filter method gives slightly different filtered feature sets for each clustering 
even when the dataset is same. However, as shown in the Table 5, results of a test that filtered same 
data set for hundred times, for each binary classification gave approximately similar accuracy values 
while the number of filtered features getting slightly changed. Figure 3 shows that there are features 
staying close to the selection margin. When the cluster center is slightly changing, these features are 
included or excluded by the margin. These features are closely located with similar characteristics. 
Therefore, the accuracy does not get affected significantly. 
 
 
Table 5: Repeated Feature Filtering Test Results 
 Classification Accuracy No of Features 
 Minimum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum Average 
Happiness 0.852494 0.864296 0.858404 171 194 182.65 
Sadness 0.82435 0.844306 0.835718 224 254 240.18 
Anger 0.890154 0.903325 0.895928 211 240 224.78 
Neutral 0.702239 0.729485 0.716392 286 313 300.13 
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Figure 3: Min_Distance VS Inclusion of Features with Happiness Characteristics - Filtered Range 
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The time taken to filter features is also another parameter to measure the performance of a 
filtering method. Low variance, Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) and Univariate feature selection 
are feature filtering methods available in sk-learn tool [36]. We measured the average filter time of 
each filter and compared it with proposing filter. According to Table 6, RFE is slow compared to new 
feature filtering method. However, statistical base methods such as Low variance are much faster than 
the new method. Though Low variance is fast, it removes less amount of features. As an overall 
performance evaluation, new feature filtering method has considerable filter time, but selects less  
number of features. 
 
 
Table 6: Performance Comparison with Other Common Methods 
 
Happiness Sadness Anger Neutral 
 
No. of 
Features 
filter time 
(seconds) 
No. of 
Features 
filter time 
(seconds) 
No. of 
Features 
filter time 
(seconds) 
No. of 
Features 
filter time 
(seconds) 
90% & 2.5 268 150.63571 356 142.67866 263 144.86095 280 128.98831 
Low 
variance 
744 0.0506901 744 0.0326299 755 0.0319149 744 0.0504839 
RFE 250 705.25111 230 554.45925 260 674.56719 270 693.01954 
Univariate 159 0.0662381 633 0.0682399 317 0.0785219 159 0.0667049 
 
 
In order to evaluate the accuracy compared to other filtering methods, we performed binary 
classification from these filtered features sets by each filter method. Apart from that, we used another 
three feature sets used in Jin, Q. et al [34]. This features sets are also developed from same original 
feature set (complete set of 1582 features). These feature sets are, 
 ACO - The utterance-level statistics of frame-level acoustic features, namely, continuous 
features (Energy: Loudness, Pitch: F0final, F0finEnv, Formants: lspFreq) and qualitative 
features (jitterLocal, jitterDDP, ShimmerLocal, Voicing final unclipped). 
 Cepstrum - The utterance-level statistics of cepstral features (statistical functions of MFCCs 
(15), logMelFreqBand (8)). 
 Cepstral-BoW – The bag-of-words feature representation based on frame-level cepstral 
features. 
Both ACO and Cepstrum consist of statistics of features directly extracted from the audio. 
Cepstral-BoW is a set of feature set that is derived from a codebook. We generated the codebook using 
cepstral features. For each cepstral feature, we clustered values of each emotion category to a single 
point separately. For the clustering, we used session 1 and 2 of the database. From this process, we 
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obtained four values for each cepstral feature. Each value denotes a centroid of an emotion category. 
Then the codebook is generated which consists of four values for each feature that represents cluster 
centers for each emotion category. We created the Cepstral-BoW feature set by using this codebook. 
We replaced value of each feature in an utterance by the closest cluster center value in the particular 
feature from the codebook. To create this Cepstral-BoW feature set we used Session 2 and 3. This 
includes both used and unused data because session 2 is used to generate the codebook. In addition to  
that, we used the full feature set in this comparison by doing a binary classification using full set. 
 
 
Table 7: Filtering and Classifying Comparison with Different Feature Sets 
 
Happiness Sadness Anger Neutral 
 
No. of 
Features 
Accuracy No. of 
Features 
Accuracy No. of 
Features 
Accuracy No. of 
Features 
Accuracy 
All 1582 0.862028 
(SVM) 
1582 0.830243 
(ABC) 
1582 0.875167 
(ABC) 
1582 0.705866 
(LR) 
ACO 616 0.862028 
(SVM) 
616 0.818885 
(ABC) 
616 0.86428 
(ABC) 
616 0.691331 
(ABC) 
Cepstrum 966 0.862028 
(SVM) 
966 0.821181 
(ABC) 
966 0.884245 
(ABC) 
966 0.71224 
(LR) 
Cep_BoW 966 0.864828 
(ABC) 
966 0.822759 
(ABC) 
966 0.90069 
(ABC) 
966 0.722069 
(ABC) 
90% & 2.5 268 0.862937 
(LR) 
356 0.838863 
(LR) 
263 0.900586 
(LDA) 
280 0.719484 
(LR) 
Low 
Variance 
744 0.862028 
(SVM) 
744 0.826608 
(ABC) 
755 0.890611 
(ABC) 
744 0.718599 
(ABC) 
RFE 250 0.865662 
(LDA) 
230 0.842517 
(LDA) 
260 0.898764 
(LDA) 
270 0.724912 
(LDA) 
Univariate 159 0.867468 
(LDA) 
633 0.830251 
(LR) 
317 0.900154 
(LR) 
159 0.719048 
(LR) 
 
 
Table 7 shows the results of the tests carried out. 90% & 2.5 feature set has shown that it can 
give comparatively higher accuracy while having less number of features in the list. Therefore, we 
obtained trained binary classifiers for each emotions with higher accuracy. These classifiers take less 
number of inputs, which is important in a real time system for fast prediction. Using session 4 and 5 of  
the database, we obtained the confusion matrix as shown in Table 8. 
 
 
Table 8: Confusion Matrix 
 FP FN TP TN 
Happiness 0.034891376 0.11323239 0.014483213 0.837393022 
Sadness 0.0520079 0.117182357 0.121132324 0.709677419 
Anger 0.097432521 0.041474654 0.200789993 0.660302831 
Neutral 0.171823568 0.206714944 0.184990125 0.436471363 
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3.5.2 Multiclass Classification 
In order to compare and make sure multiclass classification results are less accurate compared 
to binary classification, we carried out multiclass classification. Since the new feature filtering method 
filters out emotion specific feature sets, it cannot be used in multiclass classification. Therefore, we 
used Jin, Q. et al [34] feature sets. 
In multi-class classification with three feature sets, we obtained accuracies for each classifier as 
shown in Table 9. Logistic Regression (LR) gave maximum accuracy for Cepstrum and CepstrumBoW 
sets while Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) giving maximum accuracy for ACO. However, 
accuracies are in between 50-60%, which is significantly low. In this classification, we considered  
Excitement and Happiness as one category, expecting similar behavior. 
 
 
Table 9: Multiclass Classification Accuracy of Each  
Classifier for Each Feature Set 
 
ACO Cepstrum CepstrumBoW 
LR 0.524163 0.600902 0.538475 
LDA 0.56369 0.583653 0.457783 
KNN 0.397941 0.373775 0.454099 
CART 0.472022 0.488099 0.465862 
NB 0.475037 0.502309 0.459719 
SVM 0.326139 0.326139 0.357944 
ABC 0.529549 0.549869 0.534131 
Kmc 0.112849 0.110909 0.149509 
 
 
We tried different variations of the data set to identify accuracy changes in the trained models.  
 Two actors act out in each session in the database and they are not involving in other sessions. 
Therefore, testing data will not include any voice that the algorithm has seen at the training 
session. Therefore, we mixed utterances among sessions and tried the same process with 
mixed data. 
 Male and female voices have physical differences. Therefore, rather than developing a 
common model, we tried developing separate models for both male and female voices using 
separate data sets. 
 IEMOCAP database has self-annotations for each utterance. Rather than using a composite 
annotation resulting from a set of annotations, we used self-annotation and trained models. 
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 Instead of using one cluster center for each emotion to create the codebook in Cepstral-BoW, 
we tried the same process with four clusters for each emotion. Therefore, there are 16 values 
per feature in the new codebook. By this, we tried to go deeper into data point spread and 
identifying sub ranges in different emotions. 
 Instead of using Happiness and Excitement as a one category, we removed Excitement and 
retrained algorithms. 
Re-training these classifiers with different changes in the data set in order to improve accuracy 
gave similar low accuracy results as well. Table 10 shows the maximum accuracy and the given classifier, 
each feature set got for every change we did. While other changes remain with similar or less accuracies, 
removing Excitement from Happiness and creating the dataset has gained an improvement. It 
significantly shows in Cepstrum-BoW feature set, improving the accuracy from 53% to 61%. It also has  
improved ACO and Cepstrum.  
 
 
Table 10: Maximum Accuracy and the Given Classifier for Feature Sets in Multiclass Classification  
with Different Dataset Variations 
 
Using 
mixed 
sessions 
Male 
voice only 
Female 
voice only 
Self-
Evaluation 
Codebook 
with 4 centers 
Without 
Excitement 
ACO 
0.561429 
(LDA) 
0.509375 
(LR) 
0.561111 
(ABC) 
0.539137 
(LR) 
 -  
0.578328 
(LDR) 
Cepstrum 
0.576429 
(LR) 
0.54875 
(LR) 
0.588889 
(ABC) 
0.572219 
(LR) 
 -  
0.616454 
(LR) 
Cepstrum 
BoW 
0.531429 
(LR) 
0.531875 
(ABC) 
0.559722 
(LR) 
0.521946 
(LR) 
0.549095 
(ABC) 
0.61931 
(ABC) 
 
 
However, binary classification done on the same conditions to previously used feature sets 
gave significantly improved results. Table 11 shows the highest accuracy obtained from each binary 
classification from three different feature sets. Expecting Happiness and Excitement have features in 
common, classification was done considering them as a one Category. Ada Boost Classifier (ABC) 
gives the highest accuracy for identifying each emotion in every feature set. Further, the minimum 
among highest accuracy values is around 70%, which is to identify Neutral emotions in ACO category. 
This significant difference indicates that, binary classification works well than multiclass classification.  
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Table 11: Maximum Accuracy and the Classifier for Binary Classification with Three Feature Sets 
 Feature Set Hap+Exc  Sadness Anger Neutral 
ACO 0.761292(ABC) 0.841892(ABC) 0.858019(ABC) 0.707234(ABC) 
Cepstrum 0.765535(ABC) 0.852258(ABC) 0.874523(ABC) 0.719502(ABC) 
Cepstrum BoW 0.757348(ABC) 0.851056(ABC) 0.872919(ABC) 0.715932(ABC) 
 Happiness Sadness Anger Neutral 
ACO 0.862028(SVM) 0.818885(ABC) 0.864280(ABC) 0.691331(ABC) 
Cepstrum 0.862028(SVM) 0.821181(ABC) 0.884245(ABC) 0.712240(LR) 
Cepstrum BoW 0.864828(ABC) 0.822759(ABC) 0.900690(ABC) 0.722069(ABC) 
 
 
Further, after removing excitement category and taking the Happiness as a separate category, 
Happiness and Anger categories have taken significant improvements in their accuracy. Excitement has 
similarities with Happiness while having related features with Anger such as energy in the expression. 
This may have caused a gray area when distinguishing happy and anger. Specially, Cepstrum-BoW is 
created in a way that concerning the value range of emotion categories. Therefore, taking Happy as a 
separate category has stopped overlapping Happy and Anger ranges and improved the happy accuracy 
by 10%. Based upon these results, we continued using Happiness as a separate category. 
3.5.3 Fusion 
Fusion of multimodal results may improve the accuracy. In order to check the usability of 
fusion in the multiclass classifier, we fused above results. Expecting to improve the final result, we add 
a lexical component as well. In order to do that, we use sentiment analysis. Sentiment analysis of text is 
a method of identifying polarity of the speech. VADER (Valence Aware Dictionary and sEntiment 
Reasoner) [47] is an open source tool for sentiment analysis. It is specifically designed for sentiment 
analysis of the content social media. It provides positive, negative and neutral components of the 
sentiment of text. We used Vadar, which is a trained model, to analyze the text of the utterance to 
identify emotion. Therefore, the output of Vadar is directly used in the fusion.  
Therefore, the multiclass, multimodal system consists of ACO classifier, Cepstrum classifier, 
Cepstral-BoW classifier and Vadar tool. First three models classify the audio, predicting an emotion 
category out of four emotions. In order to fuse these four outputs to a single emotion, we used a 
machine-learning approach. In the machine learning approach, we developed a fusion classifier, which 
takes outputs of emotion classifier as inputs. To train the fusion classifier in supervise-learning, we 
used session 4 data from the database to remove overfitting of data.  
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The maximum accuracy of fusion algorithm is 0.545319 given by SVM. This value became 
lower than Cepstrum and ACO individual accuracy values.  
We used results of binary classification in the previous section to check behavior of fusion. In 
binary classification models, each feature set classified four times because of four emotion categories. 
Since we have three feature sets (ACO, Cepstrum and Cepstral-BoW) we got 12 outputs for a single 
utterance classification. In binary classification, we did not use lexical semantic analysis. Here we used 
a simple two tier rule based approach for fusion.  
 The first tier fuses same emotion binary classifications of three feature sets. For example, all 
three results from Happiness binary classification is fused. Therefore, first tier gives four values, each 
from one emotion category. We fused those results at the second tier. As shown in the Table 12, at the 
first tier, we decided the output based on the occurrence. Table 13 shows the combinations and relevant 
output that we used for the second tier fusion. For both tables, ‘E’ denotes an emotion while ‘NE’ is 
used to say no emotion detected. We tried adjusting the fusion rules in tables, however here we have  
shown the rule table, which gives the maximum fusion accuracy. 
 
 
Table 12: Tier 1 Fusion Rules 
Tier 1 
ACM Cepstrum Cepstral-BoW Output 1 
E E E E 
E E NE E 
E NE NE E 
NE NE NE NE 
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Table 13: Tier 2 Fusion Rules 
Tier 2 
Happiness(H) Sadness(S) Anger(A) Neutral(N) Output 2 
0 0 0 0 N 
0 0 0 1 N 
0 0 1 0 A 
0 0 1 1 A 
0 1 0 0 S 
0 1 0 1 S 
0 1 1 0 A 
0 1 1 1 A 
1 0 0 0 H 
1 0 0 1 H 
1 0 1 0 H 
1 0 1 1 H 
1 1 0 0 e 
1 1 0 1 e 
1 1 1 0 e 
1 1 1 1 e 
 
 
In the Table 13, based on appearance of each emotions, resulting emotion is decided. ‘e’ 
condition denotes error scenarios which are hard to classify. Table 14 shows a sample result set and its  
fusion for a single utterance. 
 
 
Table 14: A Sample Result Set in Binary Classification and Fusion 
 
Happiness Sadness Anger Neutral 
ACO 0 0 1 1 
Cepstrum 0 0 1 0 
Cepstrum-BoW 0 0 1 1 
Tier 1 fusion 0 0 1 1 
Tier 2 fusion Anger 
 
 
We predicted emotions using trained binary classifiers performing on session 4 and 5 data set 
of IEMOCAP database. Then used that dataset for fusion. This time we did not include lexical values at 
this fusion due to its less performance obtained in previous fusion. Once tier 1 and 2 fusion is done, we 
got 990 correct predictions out of 2015 samples. Therefore the accuracy is 49%, which is very low 
compared to all the feature set level binary classifications.  
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3.6 Conversational Emotion Flow 
Developed machine learning algorithm consists of identifying emotions (Happiness, Sadness, 
Anger, and Neutral) of utterances in conversations. For each utterance, we did binary classification for 
four emotions. Therefore, each utterance have four type of emotion measures. Depending on the 
utterance, we could identify the appearance of single or combination of emotions. We can use these 
results to visualize the emotion flow of conversations. Figures 4 & 5 shows the detected emotions of 
utterances in a dyadic conversation of speaker 1 and 2. Trend lines shows that how the each emotion is 
developing in the conversation.  Figures 4 and 5 show that, two speakers are engaged in an angry 
conversation. Therefore, other emotions have slight or no appearance in the conversation. Figure 6 
shows a comparison of Anger emotion flows of two speakers. This show that expressions of two 
speakers are involving in each other’s emotion. Analyzing such patterns will open passages to identify 
abnormal behaviors of social robots. For example, social robots that are designed to provide emotional 
support such as accompany autism patients to minimize their hyper-activities and feelings should not  
participate in emotion exchange as shown in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 4: Emotion Flow of Speaker 1 in a Dyadic Conversation 
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Figure 5: Emotion Flow of Speaker 2 in a Dyadic Conversation 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Anger Development in a Dyadic Conversation 
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4 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this research, we surveyed existing attacks and their effect on social robots. In addition, we 
researched vulnerabilities in systems that share similar characteristics with social robots. By analyzing 
both surveys, we could identify several attacks that create serious damage to social robots with existing 
or mutated versions of them. Among those attacks, we focused on abusing human emotions via human-
social robot interaction. We are trying to identify abnormal social robot behavior via emotion detection. 
As a first step, we identified emotions of conversations in this research, which will be the building 
block of identifying abnormal social robot behavior via emotion detection. 
In the emotion detection process, we have introduced a new method for feature filtering. This 
method plays competitively fast and accurate compared to other methods commonly used. Our method 
filters out comparatively a large number of features and leaves most effective features over. In the 
social robot setting, a real time emotion detection is needed in order to identify abnormalities in the 
behavior. Having less number of features will get less time for feature extraction from the audio, and 
use them in machine learning algorithm for prediction. However, in the proposed feature filtering 
method, the number of selected features slightly varies if filtered again with the same data set. As 
future work, we propose to look for improvements on finding cluster centers that can optimize filter 
accuracy for each emotion. In order to reduce the error in the cluster centers, we can repeatedly cluster 
a data set to obtain a set of cluster centers and use a second level clustering using that newly generated 
cluster centers dataset. Another way is, we can also use statistical methods such as mean or average. 
Further, a different clustering method can also be used for better accuracy. 
Another proposed future work is to develop standard feature list for emotion detection by 
using proposed method. This proposed method has two dependencies.  
 Data variance in the training data set 
 Accuracy of annotation of the data set 
A data set may not cover entire range of variance of the data for a certain emotion. If such new 
data values are found at the prediction, results will be erroneous. Therefore, a value set that has a full 
range is important. On the other hand, emotion categories that have close characteristics should be 
clearly identified in the annotation process. For example, Happy and Excitement have close values. To 
reduce these dependencies, we can combine different databases in order to incorporate much data 
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variance and normalize the annotation accuracy. Finally, we can develop a standard feature set to use in 
emotion detection. 
In the multiclass and binary classification fusion processes, we obtained low accuracies. This 
is due to accumulating errors to the result, especially at the rule based fusion method. Therefore, we 
continued our work without fusion. We developed a system to identify a single set of features that 
gives higher accuracy in classification rather than having several such as ACO, Cepstrum, 
Cepstrum_BoW, and Lexical.  On the other hand, it will not filter out information gathered for future 
levels. For example, we will have emotion flow for each emotion separately.  
The interaction of humans with social robots can significantly impact the emotional state of a 
person. As a human companion, the SR is supposed to support humans. However, it can misbehave due 
to misconfiguration or because of an attack. We have developed a model, which identifies emotions in 
human-robot interactions. As the next stage, we propose to analyze emotion flow of conversations to 
identify both short-term conversational based harmful conditions as well as suspicious emotion patterns 
in the long-term basis.  
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6 APPENDIX 
6.1 Survey 1: Attacks Methods and Social Robot 
Full version of the table, Current Threats and Protections for Social Robots in the Survey 1 attached is 
below. 
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Table 15: Current Threats and Protections for Social Robots - Full Version 
 
 
Behavior Current Protection Tools 
and Techniques 
Possibility of 
existing techniques 
Limitations to use existing 
tools 
Possible Relations to Social Robots (SR) 
Web Phishing 
  
Acquire personal 
information using,  
Social Engineering 
(fake links in emails, 
fake web pages, fake 
links in web 
advertisements), 
malicious  redirections,  
XSS attacks, Cloning 
2 factor authentication 
social engineering 
prevention methods Anti-
Phishing toolbars which 
compare visiting sites with 
phishing sites Anti-Spam 
email solutions (ZoEmail, 
Vanquish Anti-Spam, 
Vanquish Anti-Spam, 
Spamfence, Spam Arrest, 
AlienCamel, 0Spam) 
Two-factor 
authentication may 
be used if the robot 
have access to the 
secondary device. 
Separately hosted 
anti-spam email 
solutions connected 
to the email account 
may support in 
general. 
Incompatibility of 
preventions techniques for 
social engineering like 
making web pages 
personally recognizable, 
user awareness to use 
human instinct. 
Browser based solutions 
are not supporting since SR 
will not have browsers. 
Most of the phishing attacks are based on 
social engineering. In SR setting, some of 
them are obsolete, and some are beyond 
the control of SR. Ex: robots can identify 
visually similar but fake URLs while 
robots will not identify fake emails. 
Further, if attacker could route SR to a 
fake web page by other mean like setting 
up a temporary DNS, SR cannot identify 
fake visuals on that web site.  
Denial of 
Service 
 
Other Overwhelming system 
resources like Network  
bandwidth, Server 
memory, Application 
exception handling 
mechanism, CPU usage, 
Hard disk space, 
Database space and 
Database connection 
pool. This will lead to 
disturb services. 
Traffic management, load 
balancing tools, Response 
Rate Limiting(RRL), 
Collection of reverse 
proxies, SYN cookies, 
Null-Routing by ISP 
Null routing by ISP 
can be used but it is 
not in the 
controllable zone 
Limited resources and the 
nature of SR prevent using 
bulky systems such as, 
Load balancers, traffic 
management systems, and 
reverse proxies. Network 
device configurations like 
RRL cannot be expected 
from users 
This can shutdown services, which 
provide essential services or entire device. 
SYN 
flood 
Sending SYN with not 
reachable ip's to fill 
backlog queue, which 
make no room for new 
connections 
Decreasing TCP 
connection timeout in 
devices, MS Windows 
mechanism which 
monitors number of half 
opened connections and 
number of refused 
connections 
Check point firewall 
System 
configurations like 
TCP timeout can be 
used. 
Firewall protection is 
incompatible 
This can isolates the robot, so that any IoT 
device or anybody cannot connect to the 
robot, especially from outside when 
owner monitoring. 
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UDP 
Flood 
Flooding with UDP to 
perform a Dos attack 
Firewall configuration to 
filter malicious UDP, 
Load balancing, 
Configuring 
routers(thresholds) to filter 
UDP flooding 
  Firewalls and load 
balancers are incompatible 
This can overwhelm ports making 
unresponsive to clients and shutdown 
services. Further, this may cause 
performance interruption to other essential 
services like security. 
Smurf 
Flood 
Attack 
Broadcasting many 
ICMP request with 
spoofed source address. 
Victim receive flooding. 
Shutting Broadcast 
addressing features in 
routers and firewalls, 
configuring end nodes not 
to respond ICMP requests 
  Node configuration is hard 
for SR users 
Firewalls will not available 
for SR setting 
SR may provide set of essential services 
via internet or in-house network. Ex: 
Online home monitoring, in-house device 
control. Attacker who is connected to the 
internet or connected to the home network 
can use this attack to shutdown such 
services. 
Malicious 
software 
(Malware) 
Virus, 
Trojan 
horse, 
Spyware, 
Ransom
ware, 
Backdoo
rs/remot
e access, 
Trojan, 
Bugs 
   Virus - execute itself 
and spread by infecting 
other programs and files 
   Trojan horse - 
Pretending as a 
legitimate program and 
get into the system 
   Spyware - Collect 
data n info without 
permission 
   Ransomware - Infect 
and encrypt data 
  Backdoors/remote 
access Trojan - Secretly 
creates backdoors to 
connect remotely 
   Bugs - making 
processes to giving 
undesired outcomes 
Anti-social Engineering 
based identification and 
prevention methods 
Anti-virus software 
firewalls 
Many malware detectors 
  The systems like firewalls 
does not compatible with 
SR, Anti-virus and malware 
detectors needs to be light 
weighted if inserting to SR. 
Still that will need many 
resources and that affect the 
system performance. 
Further defending methods 
for social engineering 
attacks can also become 
unsupportive. 
SR environment is vulnerable for these 
malicious activities and there can be many 
ways malicious codes getting into the SR 
system. They can make more harmful 
actions based on the nature of SR. For 
example spyware can collect more 
personal information, rootkits can 
manipulate movements of SR 
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Internet 
Worms 
A malicious program 
that can replicate it by 
itself and can travel 
across the network 
without human action.  
Apart from that, the 
basic malicious function 
can be changed based 
on the purpose it 
created.  
User based identification 
and prevention methods, 
Anti-virus software, 
firewalls, Timely system 
updates 
Automatic timely 
system updates will 
closedown system 
loop-holes as much 
as possible 
Prevention methods based 
on user will not help. Bulky 
anti-virus software will not 
support SR setting. 
Firewalls will not be 
available in SR setting 
Worms can spread in SR setting and 
deliver malicious activities. They can 
make system issues, utilize limited 
resources, information theft in the robotic 
system 
Botnet 
Attacks 
become a spam bot that 
render advertisement on 
websites 
become web spider that 
scrapes server data 
distributing malware 
disguised as popular 
search items on 
download sites 
Participating in Ddos 
attacks 
Spamming Sniffing 
traffic 
Key logging 
Participating in 
manipulating online 
polls/games etc. 
Honeypot/Honeynet, IRC 
tracking, DNS tracking, 
DNS tracking, Firewall 
protection, IDS/IPS 
  Hard to implement 
prevention tools inside SR 
since they are light 
weighted and mobile. In 
addition, SR are not 
working in heavily secured 
sophisticated networks. 
Therefore, Honeypot kind 
of solutions are also 
helpless. 
SR can become a zombie robot. Its setup 
support botnet activities. There can be 
many idle robots to utilize and on the 
other hand, robot performance can be 
degraded because of botnet activities. 
These activities may target outside targets 
or they can harm the user as well. There 
can be a little chance to become a target of 
a botnet. 
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Rootkit 
Attacks 
Intruder get root access 
to the system and he can 
do anything that an 
administrative user 
(root) can do. 
Anti-social engineering 
concepts for users like not 
clicking on unknown 
emails, attachments, links, 
installing certified 
software, etc. 
User based or Kernel 
based anti-rootkit software 
(Linux: chkrootkit, Lynis, 
ISPProtect, rkhunter; 
Android: Lookout, 
malwarebytes, rootkit 
detector; Windows: 
Milano, Webroot, F-
Secure blacklight; 
Windows RT: Webroot; 
IOS: Lookout, Webroot; 
OS X: Osquery, Webroot) 
  Most of the social robots do 
not have performance 
capability as other 
computers since their 
resources are limited. 
Therefore running a rootkit 
scanner may cause 
additional hit to its 
performance. In addition, 
most of the rootkit 
detectors are offline, that is 
not a proper solution since 
SR need real time 
solutions, and users may 
not need to have such 
offline solutions. Hence, 
this may not be a perfect 
solution. Limitations in 
prevention methods to 
social engineering attacks. 
On the other hand bringing 
them in to a separate 
central system like a cloud 
for monitoring may create 
complex infrastructure 
requirements with 
additional heavy processes. 
An intruder getting root access will allow 
himself to do number of harmful actions 
in SR. Different robots have different 
capabilities. Therefore based on the 
capabilities intruder may get more 
chances. Higher capabilities higher the 
risk. 
Ex: A robot who can move around the 
house and pick door locks can let the 
intruders physically come in. A robot who 
has cameras, microphones may let 
intruders to spy. 
Mobile 
Malware 
Malicious codes get 
inside from different 
ways, and perform 
malicious activities on 
mobile devices 
Installing apps only from 
trusted sources, using 
mobile protections 
systems, prevent 
jailbreaking,  
Timely system updates, 
  
Most of the existing 
tools and techniques 
can be used in SR to 
secure them 
  There are several operating systems used 
in SR. If SR start using mobile platforms, 
mobile malware can affect SR. However, 
SR are having different design than other 
mobile devices. Therefore some mobile 
malware can be more harmful than 
expected 
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Zero-day Attack 
  
Exploit previously 
unknown vulnerabilities 
Updating/Patching Automatic updating 
and Patching can be 
done 
Knowledge of users of SR 
to do updates and patching 
SR can have this type of attacks as other 
systems. In addition, in the similar way, 
designers have to foresee such 
vulnerabilities before attackers, and take 
necessary actions. 
Session Hijacking 
  
Through session 
fixation, sidejacking, 
cross-site scripting or 
physical access become 
a middle man  
Tunneling, IPSec, 
Encryption(SSl/TLS), 
Using long random 
numbers or strings, 
Regenerating the session 
id after login, changing 
cookie values with each 
and every request, 
secondary checks like ip 
matching 
Protocol security and 
application level 
secure options can 
be used  
  This can happen in SR setting in the 
similar way that happens in other 
contexts. That will leak information from 
SR and may be used to spy 
OS Vulnerabilities 
  
A malware or network 
based attack through OS 
loopholes by Stealing 
information, destructive 
operations using codes, 
scripts, active content 
and etc. 
Regular software patching Automatic software 
patching 
Cannot expect user to 
install new patches timely, 
because the intended users 
may range from small 
children to old patients 
OS vulnerability attacks are acting in a 
similar way for SR as well. But since SR 
of should support more hardware (Motors, 
sensors) than a computer, it could have 
more vulnerability chances than a general 
computer 
Platform 
Vulnerabilities 
  
Steal information, 
destructive operations 
using codes, scripts, 
active content and etc. 
System updates and 
patches 
Frequent auto 
updates and patching 
will help to mitigate 
the risk of such 
vulnerabilities 
Updates and patches need 
to done automatically since 
knowledge of user in that 
context cannot be expected 
in SR scenario 
System vulnerabilities will be there for 
many systems including SR. That can 
leave spaces to use by attackers in 
different ways.  
Application 
Vulnerabilities 
  
Backdoors are let open 
by applications to 
attacker for executing 
commands and access 
data. 
Regular software 
patching, using antivirus 
software 
Regular updates and 
patching in API and 
factory developed 
applications 
Unlike Apple, Google or 
Microsoft there is no 
structure for validating the 
security concerns of new 
apps developed using 
API's, before they get 
available for ROS or 
related OS in robots 
Some robotic platforms provide APIs to 
develop user applications for the robot. 
There is no certificate for security of those 
apps. These new and existing apps may 
have a big chance to include many 
vulnerabilities 
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Buffer Overflow 
  
This is a general error 
but an attacker can use 
it to exploit program 
buffer. Setting more 
data to the buffer than it 
is defined can leads to 
crash the program or set 
new values to adjacent 
variables. Stack-based 
overflow, Heap-based 
overflow, Integer 
overflow, String 
overflow, Unicode 
overflow 
Updating/Patching, Safe 
coding, 
Compiler based 
detection(setting random 
values aka canaries to 
check), Operating system 
based non-executable 
stacks and ASLR(Address 
Space Layout 
Randomization) 
Auto-updating and 
patching will remove 
loop-holes, Code 
standards 
  This could affect different programs 
running inside the robot; hence, different 
service may be shut down. Thus can be 
critical if the program is critical 
Spoofing Packet 
Spoofing 
Forge the source and 
pretend as a trusted src. 
This can lead to session 
hijacking or intercepting 
network traffic. 
 
Configure ACL(Access 
Control List) to Deny 
incoming packets if source 
address is allocated to 
your network,  
Deny outbound packets if 
source address is not 
allocated to your network 
Unicast Reverse Path 
Forwarding (uRPF); 
discarding IP packets that 
lack a verifiable IP source 
address in the IP routing 
table. 
IP Source Guard is a 
Layer 2 security 
ACL and uRPF Cannot expect network 
configurations from general 
users 
This can be used to steal information from 
SR or can use this to spy on the user or 
environment. 
MAC 
Address 
Spoofing 
Change MAC to some 
authorized MAC and 
pretend as someone else 
in the network. Some 
OS are allowing 
Cisco port security   Network configurations 
cannot be expected from 
SR users 
Regardless of the systems, this can 
happen. SR will send traffic to the 
intruder. He will read the information. 
This can lead to other attacks as well. 
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changing the MAC.  
Related to Data Link 
Layer. 
IP 
Address 
Spoofing 
Attack 
Change IP to some 
authorized IP and 
pretend as someone else 
in the network.  
Related to Network 
Layer. 
Configure ACL(Access 
Control List) to Deny 
incoming packets if source 
address is allocated to 
your network,  
Deny outbound packets if 
source address is not 
allocated to your network 
  
Peer-to-peer (P2P) 
File Sharing 
  
Installing malicious 
codes, access through 
opening ports, stealing 
info, dos 
Anti-virus software, 
firewalls 
  Protecting FTP by using 
firewalls and virus guards 
is difficult in SR 
SR may have FTP connections with user 
smart phone or personal computer. Other 
than that based on different application 
requirements FTP connections may be 
needed. There is a possible risk of 
malicious activities on peer to peer 
connections 
Scanning and probing 
  
Available services and 
ports will be revealed, 
This is a legitimate 
audit function as well. 
There are different 
commercial tools that are 
used to probing in good 
purpose and bad purpose. 
Using them in protecting 
way and identify network 
vulnerabilities. 
Keeping close the port that 
are not using. 
Using firewalls and 
IDS/IPS to identify 
spoofing attacks 
By default, keeping 
non-using ports 
closed 
probing to check 
vulnerabilities and securing 
ports for security purposes 
is better for large service 
providers, but it does not 
supporting for SR. Users 
will not perform such 
administrative tasks for SR. 
SR services may uses number of ports for 
its services. Based on applications SR has 
ports may get unsecured. Insecure, kept 
open ports will expose the robot to the 
outside, which can lead to an attack 
Traffic (Packet) 
Sniffing 
  
Reading packets in the 
middle of the network. 
This is also a legitimate 
function as well. 
There are different tools 
that can capture the traffic 
and convert data into 
human readable format. 
Encryptions and 
Light weighted anti-
sniffing tool can be 
used 
though a sniffer is 
identified, there may be 
less chances to take actions 
Regardless of the system type, this attack 
can happen. Any data traveling through 
the network is at risk at this point. In SR 
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Using them to identify 
vulnerabilities and take 
precautions. 
Encrypting (SSL, TSL) 
data, but this still reveals 
src and dst details 
Using commercial ant 
sniff software 
in a home network with SR 
users 
setting it home network consists of more 
data than a regular home network. 
Eavesdropping 
  
Unauthorized real time 
interception of a private 
communication. 
Wiretapping is the 
method for conventional 
telephones, for VoIP, 
there are sniffing tools 
to read the IP packets. 
Encrypting data before 
transmit., avoiding public 
networks and using VPN 
Encryption can be 
used in SR to make 
the communication 
secure 
  SR may involve in communication like 
phone calls, messages. Therefore VoIP 
(including conventional telephony traffic 
in a way, since SR may be capable of 
connecting phones. Ex: vehicle audio 
support for calls) and other messaging 
traffic will transfer through SR to user or 
out from user. Attackers can eavesdrop 
user's communication via SR 
ARP Poisoning 
  
Replace the MAC to an 
existing IP is poisoning. 
This can be used to act 
as a man in middle, 
setting same MAC to 
several ip's to create a 
DOS attack, steal 
session id and hijack the 
session. 
ARP spoofing software 
include ARPspoof, Cain 
& Abel, ARPpoison and 
Ettercap. 
Packet filtering- inspect 
packets as they are 
transmitted across a 
network. 
ARP spoofing detection 
software- Programs 
inspecting and certifying 
data before it is 
transmitted and blocking 
data that appears to be 
spoofed. 
Cryptographic network 
protocols- Transport Layer 
Security (TLS), Secure 
Shell (SSH), HTTP Secure 
(HTTPS) and other secure 
communications protocols 
bolster ARP spoofing 
Using cryptographic 
protocols is a 
possible solution 
related to SR 
Hard to expect network 
monitoring in a home 
network 
Home networks where SR are residing are 
not most secured with firewalls and other 
protection mechanisms. There is a more 
chance to be attacked in such network. 
Resulting MITM, DoS, Session hijacking, 
Spoofing, Sniffing and many other attacks 
on SR 
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attack prevention by 
encrypting data prior to 
transmission and 
authenticating data when 
it is received. 
Broadcast Storm 
  
Overwhelming by 
continuous multicast or 
broadcast  
Judicious use of firewalls, 
Better network 
configurations, storm 
controls 
  Firewalls and network 
configuration to prevent 
such attacks cannot be 
expected in a home 
network 
Attacker can shut down the robots 
connectivity and that can be a security 
threat, and will interrupt services 
Offline 
Authentication 
attacks(Brute Force, 
Dictionary, Rainbow 
table) 
  
Use stolen or other 
available information to 
guess passwords and 
PINs not trying with 
online systems 
Using CAPTCHA's, 
account locking, 
progressive delays, 
salting, Strong password 
structures, biometrics, 
tokens 
Almost all of the 
tools and techniques 
are supporting to SR 
setting 
Passwords are mostly 
stored 
SR can be a single access point for many 
accounts of the user. Once the authority is 
given by user, SR will access these 
accounts frequently with or without the 
telling the user. This attack will work in 
SR similar to other systems. 
DHCP Attacks 
  
With fake MAC, 
exhaust dhcp srv and 
setup rough dhcp 
(DHCP Starvation 
attack). Attacker can act 
like a trusted node like 
DNS or default gateway 
(DHCP spoofing attack) 
Port security   Network configurations 
cannot be expected from 
SR users 
Regardless of the systems, this can 
happen. SR will send traffic to the 
intruder. He will read the information. 
This can lead to other attacks as well. 
MAC Table Overflow 
  
Make the switch 
flooding using fake mac 
address. Router flushes 
the mac table and starts 
broadcasting all the 
packets. Attacker can 
receive all the frames. 
Cisco port security   Heavy network security 
and administration are not 
available in home network 
setting,  
Regardless of the device connected to the 
network, this problem happens. Attacker 
can get data travelling around specially 
communication between SR and IoT 
devices, User mobile phone, Laptop or 
computer. That makes this attack in SR 
setting more harmful 
Weak Passwords 
  
Breaking simple 
passwords and get 
access 
Strong password 
structures 
Strong password 
structures 
  Attacks for weak passwords can happen in 
SR as they use password-protected 
accounts. Users of SR can be vary from 
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child to elderly person. The chances to 
have a weak password is high 
Unapproved apps and 
portable devices 
  
Malicious codes get 
inside through untrusted 
app installation or 
physically connecting 
devices like USB 
storages 
Anti-Virus guards, 
Controlling restrictions of 
access 
Access controlling, 
Providing secure and 
trusted platform to 
install apps 
Resource limitations to use 
inbuilt virus guard or 
detection systems 
Some robotic platforms provide APIs to 
develop user applications for the robot. 
There is no certificate for security of those 
apps. Vulnerabilities in these apps may 
invite more attacks. Further, attackers can 
also use these APIs to bait SR users. 
Devices connecting to SR may be a media 
to get into the system as well 
Data loss from lost or 
stolen device 
  
By their nature, handy 
portable devices can be 
physically stolen 
Locating mechanisms 
using GPS to locate and 
password/fingerprint/face 
recognition protection till 
it found, 
Online data erasing 
mechanisms 
Current protection 
mechanism are still 
valid for SR setting. 
To make it more 
secure, encrypting 
can be used for 
storing data in SR 
  Often SR authenticate the user using face 
recognition. If such security methods are 
accurate enough, that could prevent 
outsiders or people who stole it using the 
SR. That will prevent data access 
somewhat. In addition, unlike mobile 
phones or laptops, SR does not provide 
much easier file system accessing 
mechanism. Hence it will make it bit 
complex to access data from a stolen SR. 
Attacker may need to get hardware level 
to access data or reset configurations. 
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6.2 Binary Classification Data 
Additional data for binary classification with Happiness and Excitement for ACO, Cepstrum and 
Cepstrum-BOW feature sets is added here. 
 
Table 16: Binary Classification for ACO with Happiness and Excitement 
 ACO 
  Hap+Exc  Sadness Anger Neutral 
LR 0.743283 0.830385 0.842657 0.684188 
LDA 0.755187 0.833837 0.848411 0.690354 
KNN 0.714122 0.785886 0.789704 0.641992 
CART 0.68725 0.79047 0.788192 0.639285 
NB 0.624686 0.651575 0.72487 0.575197 
SVM 0.72794 0.787395 0.810805 0.673861 
ABC 0.761292 0.841892 0.858019 0.707234 
Kmc 0.178718 0.11863 0.105097 0.10893 
 
 
Table 17: Binary Classification for Cepstrum with Happiness and Excitement 
 CEP 
  Hap+Exc  Sadness Anger Neutral 
LR 0.758631 0.838441 0.866453 0.724861 
LDA 0.738706 0.825385 0.871055 0.69111 
KNN 0.711054 0.750576 0.825389 0.594419 
CART 0.704556 0.782038 0.819633 0.668821 
NB 0.610516 0.775507 0.709892 0.5821 
SVM 0.72794 0.787395 0.810805 0.673861 
ABC 0.765535 0.852258 0.874523 0.719502 
Kmc 0.178473 0.097496 0.077121 0.074829 
 
 
Table 18: Binary Classification for Cepstrum-BoW with Happiness and Excitement 
 CEP_BOW 
  Hap+Exc  Sadness Anger Neutral 
LR 0.702146 0.814833 0.839565 0.675131 
LDA 0.654405 0.746406 0.771141 0.632539 
KNN 0.698106 0.80795 0.83724 0.669354 
CART 0.686031 0.79009 0.833792 0.663584 
NB 0.588267 0.76367 0.671656 0.571015 
SVM 0.722254 0.776872 0.826899 0.683177 
ABC 0.757348 0.851056 0.872919 0.715932 
Kmc 0.109265 0.110378 0.094881 0.09315 
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Additional data for binary classification without Excitement for ACO, Cepstrum and Cepstrum-BOW  
feature sets is added here. 
 
 
Table 19: Binary Classification for ACO without Excitement 
 ACO 
 Happiness  Sadness Anger Neutral 
LR: 0.846137 0.812536 0.844286 0.659566 
LDA: 0.827972 0.808453 0.848813 0.671802 
KNN: 0.844778 0.739428 0.779817 0.59782 
CART: 0.779385 0.751228 0.794774 0.632351 
NB: 0.396687 0.648182 0.77986 0.562022 
SVM: 0.862028 0.74355 0.779831 0.614591 
ABC: 0.852501 0.818885 0.86428 0.691331 
Kmc: 0.1411 0.123019 0.164809 0.116154 
 
 
Table 20: Binary Classification for Cepstrum without Excitement 
 CEP 
 Happiness  Sadness Anger Neutral 
LR: 0.83023 0.824342 0.872908 0.71224 
LDA: 0.801213 0.797112 0.867892 0.672768 
KNN: 0.852954 0.699981 0.80754 0.567919 
CART: 0.775309 0.776189 0.827061 0.659111 
NB: 0.565564 0.746242 0.748513 0.601039 
SVM: 0.862028 0.74355 0.779831 0.614591 
ABC: 0.853836 0.821181 0.884245 0.696345 
Kmc: 0.103965 0.144443 0.144938 0.100765 
 
 
Table 21: Binary Classification for Cepstrum-BoW without Excitement 
 CEP_BOW 
 Happiness  Sadness Anger Neutral 
LR: 0.776552 0.784828 0.837931 0.669655 
LDA: 0.689655 0.677931 0.791034 0.613793 
KNN: 0.846207 0.781379 0.828966 0.629655 
CART: 0.770345 0.764828 0.848966 0.658621 
NB: 0.650345 0.755172 0.718621 0.657931 
SVM: 0.863448 0.734483 0.792414 0.615862 
ABC: 0.864828 0.822759 0.90069 0.722069 
Kmc: 0.109655 0.154483 0.175172 0.111034 
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6.3 Fusion Data 
Table 22: Variations of Tier 2 Fusion Rules 
Tier 2 Fusion 
Hap(H) Sad(S) Ang(A) Neu(N) O/P v1 O/P v2 O/P v3 O/P v4 O/P v5 
0 0 0 0 E N N N N 
0 0 0 1 N N N N N 
0 0 1 0 A A A A A 
0 0 1 1 A A A A A 
0 1 0 0 S S S S S 
0 1 0 1 S S S S S 
0 1 1 0 A A A A A 
0 1 1 1 E A S A A 
1 0 0 0 H H H H H 
1 0 0 1 H H H H H 
1 0 1 0 E H A H H 
1 0 1 1 E H A H H 
1 1 0 0 E E E N H 
1 1 0 1 E E E N H 
1 1 1 0 E E E N H 
1 1 1 1 E E E N H 
 
6.4 Feature Filtering Data 
In order to identify best set of features, different combinations of Inclusion and Min_Distance is 
tested. Below table contains the results of the test.
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Table 23: Binary Classifier Accuracy for Inclusion and Min_Distance Combinations - Full 
 
 
15_all 30_all 40_2 40_2.5 40_3 50_2 65_2 80_2 80_2.5 80_3 80_3.5 80_4 
A
n
g
er
 
LR 0.778922 0.787995 0.781647 0.781645 0.781647 0.863367 0.871086 0.871086 0.891514 0.891518 0.876524 0.868809 
LDA 0.778922 0.776645 0.773015 0.77165 0.772096 0.852478 0.876991 0.876991 0.885613 0.883344 0.871989 0.867896 
KNN 0.738943 0.752616 0.753949 0.75123 0.744883 0.769383 0.765294 0.765294 0.771187 0.770294 0.798447 0.827042 
CART 0.675872 0.744436 0.711271 0.693579 0.695378 0.789375 0.818877 0.818877 0.811156 0.821615 0.832497 0.814369 
NB 0.775296 0.545607 0.668612 0.753501 0.761674 0.664531 0.752631 0.752631 0.762153 0.777585 0.789846 0.804823 
SVM 0.778013 0.776656 0.779831 0.779831 0.774381 0.779831 0.779831 0.779831 0.779831 0.779831 0.779831 0.779831 
ABC 0.770757 0.793459 0.770302 0.769848 0.774829 0.852009 0.863361 0.863361 0.874729 0.862923 0.868824 0.861104 
Kmc 0.004988 0.040864 0.113908 0.107972 0.155261 0.098005 0.142137 0.142137 0.089478 0.056789 0.204757 0.108371 
 
 
15_all 30_all 40_2 40_2.5 40_3 50_2 65_2 80_2 80_2.5 80_3 80_3.5 80_4 
H
a
p
p
in
es
s 
LR 0.862028 0.862028 0.859755 0.86021 0.862028 0.860666 0.859303 0.862016 0.862026 0.860671 0.862028 0.862028 
LDA 0.861573 0.86021 0.859755 0.860662 0.862028 0.858392 0.856586 0.855683 0.857483 0.862493 0.862937 0.862028 
KNN 0.844317 0.851135 0.847954 0.848852 0.855222 0.854761 0.852046 0.850237 0.850216 0.841604 0.847511 0.847517 
CART 0.762145 0.757618 0.763046 0.752158 0.837964 0.751236 0.757598 0.788937 0.805278 0.788056 0.784864 0.751703 
NB 0.822536 0.314099 0.383573 0.799831 0.842065 0.411664 0.485202 0.574192 0.624585 0.657273 0.684957 0.803924 
SVM 0.859305 0.859303 0.862028 0.862028 0.85885 0.862028 0.862028 0.862028 0.862028 0.862028 0.863387 0.860212 
ABC 0.858396 0.857483 0.852046 0.857038 0.857493 0.845224 0.843861 0.844774 0.851131 0.852042 0.853865 0.857046 
Kmc 0.05448 0.073571 0.13261 0.105249 0.011783 0.077633 0.146028 0.102653 0.062563 0.148863 0.139334 0.100695 
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15_all 30_all 40_2 40_2.5 40_3 50_2 65_2 80_2 80_2.5 80_3 80_3.5 80_4 
N
eu
tr
a
l 
LR 0.613682 0.620037 0.612779 0.614591 0.614591 0.65094 0.699556 0.723137 0.715411 0.709044 0.697234 0.641364 
LDA 0.617314 0.612314 0.594169 0.615045 0.614591 0.66594 0.682302 0.696357 0.70225 0.716288 0.699039 0.657711 
KNN 0.58827 0.548797 0.560594 0.543815 0.551503 0.592842 0.602369 0.597371 0.583318 0.588737 0.655033 0.663638 
CART 0.563291 0.620506 0.589687 0.535142 0.521981 0.625072 0.623239 0.630967 0.637807 0.6532 0.660006 0.655033 
NB 0.503455 0.540226 0.502548 0.498451 0.4939 0.538433 0.545685 0.564724 0.572443 0.576989 0.567445 0.566522 
SVM 0.610936 0.600072 0.614591 0.614591 0.611868 0.614591 0.614591 0.614591 0.614591 0.614591 0.61414 0.674089 
ABC 0.625051 0.649095 0.636837 0.586886 0.595961 0.683626 0.681366 0.711752 0.710847 0.716759 0.698163 0.674101 
Kmc 0.012721 0.093544 0.1031 0.115732 0.066742 0.109749 0.113429 0.127158 0.122505 0.152534 0.122145 0.113011 
 
 
15_all 30_all 40_2 40_2.5 40_3 50_2 65_2 80_2 80_2.5 80_3 80_3.5 80_4 
S
a
d
n
es
s 
LR 0.742641 0.784831 0.80935 0.81253 0.794803 0.826619 0.828885 0.82977 0.831139 0.830247 0.825257 0.7971 
LDA 0.74355 0.784377 0.808433 0.803453 0.787092 0.823877 0.826608 0.825226 0.833416 0.827966 0.821166 0.80391 
KNN 0.721312 0.719467 0.77849 0.791203 0.796205 0.753509 0.684066 0.708106 0.734926 0.724029 0.755804 0.744436 
CART 0.727186 0.768063 0.768955 0.781201 0.779401 0.781222 0.782589 0.779375 0.779864 0.760339 0.769426 0.769854 
NB 0.492489 0.573747 0.726281 0.714938 0.714029 0.727643 0.736705 0.765738 0.743517 0.736259 0.735346 0.738525 
SVM 0.734033 0.74673 0.792102 0.820701 0.814364 0.74355 0.74355 0.74355 0.74355 0.74355 0.74491 0.773947 
ABC 0.775755 0.803023 0.811174 0.81072 0.806625 0.818902 0.825241 0.827974 0.826608 0.826162 0.808457 0.788947 
Kmc 0.131098 0.091292 0.151074 0.13252 0.121168 0.093023 0.070825 0.109698 0.123593 0.137577 0.189299 0.138453 
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Table 24: Binary Classifier Accuracy for Inclusion and Min_Distance Combinations - Full, Continue 
 
 
90_2 90_2.5 90_3 90_3.5 100_2 all 
A
n
g
er
 
LR 0.887437 0.896528 0.896508 0.889706 0.880173 0.851111 
LDA 0.903772 0.900586 0.89832 0.885605 0.887884 0.814334 
KNN 0.814782 0.806592 0.789817 0.803906 0.813418 0.795718 
CART 0.836592 0.827507 0.835212 0.836586 0.828422 0.817528 
NB 0.760333 0.761238 0.770321 0.776676 0.755784 0.756234 
SVM 0.779831 0.779831 0.779831 0.779831 0.779831 0.779831 
ABC 0.881061 0.882423 0.873355 0.87246 0.885605 0.875167 
Kmc 0.177818 0.105617 0.127236 0.075856 0.102939 0.109364 
 
 
90_2 90_2.5 90_3 90_3.5 100_2 all 
H
a
p
p
in
es
s 
LR 0.851578 0.862937 0.86703 0.867026 0.845681 0.827962 
LDA 0.84115 0.857497 0.861573 0.869751 0.845245 0.733104 
KNN 0.847503 0.849313 0.841127 0.848398 0.846598 0.844784 
CART 0.787585 0.789404 0.776246 0.777164 0.77942 0.775302 
NB 0.586444 0.606882 0.601444 0.638182 0.597785 0.527425 
SVM 0.862028 0.862028 0.862028 0.862028 0.862028 0.862028 
ABC 0.844307 0.854307 0.859303 0.862941 0.85884 0.859755 
Kmc 0.084473 0.115197 0.097577 0.142077 0.106222 0.101183 
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90_2 90_2.5 90_3 90_3.5 100_2 all 
N
eu
tr
a
l 
LR 0.715856 0.719484 0.720852 0.706767 0.719044 0.705866 
LDA 0.694529 0.70042 0.714031 0.698143 0.691329 0.621446 
KNN 0.602812 0.584671 0.600078 0.661845 0.603723 0.581026 
CART 0.645041 0.64369 0.643659 0.654111 0.649998 0.666876 
NB 0.570171 0.571985 0.572896 0.564264 0.573789 0.585627 
SVM 0.614591 0.614591 0.614591 0.614595 0.614591 0.614591 
ABC 0.703566 0.718114 0.710854 0.714486 0.706314 0.705426 
Kmc 0.159823 0.133036 0.146606 0.117114 0.123383 0.10803 
 
 
90_2 90_2.5 90_3 90_3.5 100_2 all 
S
a
d
n
es
s 
LR 0.825687 0.838863 0.835699 0.827982 0.8266 0.81298 
LDA 0.827057 0.83296 0.829342 0.81936 0.825695 0.727674 
KNN 0.698603 0.739914 0.72267 0.758523 0.698603 0.741715 
CART 0.781211 0.793965 0.764412 0.768515 0.773472 0.783052 
NB 0.747602 0.746242 0.738986 0.741248 0.75078 0.744412 
SVM 0.74355 0.74355 0.74355 0.74355 0.74355 0.74355 
ABC 0.827534 0.822522 0.812538 0.806652 0.826613 0.830243 
Kmc 0.13935 0.115358 0.105755 0.138034 0.092199 0.114329 
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Figure 7: Min_Distance vs. Inclusion of Features with Anger Characteristics 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Min_Distance vs. Inclusion of Features with Neutral Characteristics 
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Figure 9: Min_Distance vs. Inclusion of Features with Sadness Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10
Sadness
62 
 
 
 
Table 25: Predicted Emotions in a Dyadic Conversation - Speaker 1 
Utterance Happiness Sadness Anger Neutral 
8 0 0 1 0 
9 0 0 1 0 
10 0 0 1 1 
11 0 0 0 1 
15 0 0 1 0 
20 0 0 1 0 
23 0 0 1 0 
24 0 0 0 0 
25 0 0 0 0 
26 0 0 1 0 
27 0 0 1 0 
28 0 0 1 0 
29 0 0 1 0 
30 0 0 1 0 
31 0 0 1 0 
32 0 0 1 0 
33 0 0 1 0 
34 0 0 1 0 
35 0 0 0 0 
36 0 0 1 0 
37 0 0 1 0 
38 0 0 1 0 
39 0 0 1 0 
40 0 0 1 0 
41 0 0 1 0 
42 0 0 1 0 
43 0 0 1 0 
44 0 0 1 0 
45 0 0 1 0 
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Table 26: Predicted Emotions in a Dyadic Conversation - Speaker 2 
Utterance Happiness Sadness Anger Neutral 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 
12 0 1 0 0 
15 0 1 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 
18 0 0 1 0 
23 0 0 0 0 
26 0 0 0 0 
28 1 0 0 1 
34 0 0 0 0 
35 0 0 1 0 
36 0 0 1 0 
37 0 0 1 0 
38 0 0 1 0 
39 1 0 1 1 
40 0 0 0 0 
41 0 0 1 0 
42 0 0 0 0 
43 0 0 0 0 
44 0 0 1 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
